Editor’s Note: This report is the third installment of a four-part assessment of al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY). The assessment will focus on targeting strategies, group dynamics, counter-offensive efforts, and future implications.
Highlights
– Security officials have made significant progress in detaining terrorists since January 2008
– Yemeni government increases security measures to combat al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) operations
– As a result, AQY may have slowed its tempo of attacks, however, outside funding and reorganizing strategies could potentially lead to more attacks in the mid-term
A recent report from the Yemeni Ministry of Interior revealed that the Yemeni police arrested 220 out “of 1,045 terrorist suspects in 2007.” Now six months into 2008, the Yemeni police have already arrested approximately 150 terrorist suspects, most of whom are likely to be members or affiliates of the al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) organization. Yemen has had a high number of significant and high profile attacks so far this year to include a March 2008 failed attack on the United States (US) Embassy .
Nonetheless, the government has also been more effective in its counter-offense efforts, including shutting down almost 200 weapons stores in Yemen and confiscating approximately 140,000 weapons. The cycle of low-level terrorist activity and corresponding high-level counter measures and vice versa, however, will likely continue for the mid-term, as terrorists tend to recruit, regroup, and reorganize during times of high security crackdowns.
Timeline of Security Developments and Terrorist Arrests
Yemeni security forces started the year off strong, arresting a total of 36 AQY suspects for their involvement in the January 18, 2008 attack against Belgian tourists . The arrests took place over the course of two to three weeks in January. As a result of the attack, the Yemeni government announced in February 2008 that it would provide armed escorts to tourists traveling to certain areas. In both January and February, AQY was not as active as in the months to follow, which may have been a direct result of Yemen’s security improvements that month.
In March and April, however, the cycle shifted. Yemeni security forces arrested a mere five AQY suspects in two months, following the failed attack on the US Embassy in March 2008. During those months, the group conducted six separate attacks, making the spring of 2008 one of AQY most successful seasons of attacks (Previous Report).
Shifting the cycle once more, the past two and one half months have been especially fruitful for the Yemeni government. So far, the bulk of this year’s arrests tally has continued to accumulate, resulting in the arrests of over 100 terrorist suspects. Specifically, May 2008 was reportedly the most successful month for security forces:
• Yemeni police identified and arrested 70 AQY militants loyal to rebel leader Imam Abdul Malik al-Houthi
• Government re-incarcerates USS Cole bombing operative, Jaber al-Bana, after his earlier release prompted US concerns .
• Security forces detained 11 AQY suspects, who have provided information on a number of AQY attacks
Although June and July have not been as successful for security forces as the month of May 2008, a large number of terrorists have been detained and government officials have increased security measures nationwide to combat the remnants of AQY.
Forecast: Security Cycle Shifts in the Midterm
As the remaining members of AQY have used the previous months to clandestinely recruit, reorganize, and re-strategize their operations, we anticipate that the cycle of low-level terrorist attacks/high-level counter measures will shift in the midterm. Security measures have slowed by mid-July 2008, and the AQY organization has already conducted a failed attack on June 30, 2008, when it fired three rockets at an oil refinery east of Sanaa and missed .
We believe AQY will continue to coordinate and carry out attacks against Western interests and government target in the near to mid-term. However, Yemeni security forces will likely increase security measures in the interim to try and counter the group’s operations.
