Recent weeks have witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab League has revived a 2002 initiative for ending the Palestinian crisis and enabling a comprehensive peace between Israel and Arab countries. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert has responded favorably to the proposal – yet with critical caveats – and publicly called for a regional summit involving all major players to the conflict.
Despite the diplomatic momentum, there remain political obstacles that will likely scuttle any real progress towards solving the conflict. The Arab countries demand Palestinian refugees receive the right of return (ROR) to their homes in Israel, a non-starter for the Israeli government. Moreover, long-term prospects for sustaining the ‘unity’ of the newly formed Fatah-Hamas unity government appear dim, and the likelihood persists of a repeated outbreak of chaos in the Palestinian Territories.
Motivations
The spate of recent diplomatic activity is motivated by a desire to end the Palestinian-Israeli violence, thereby removing the prime cause of destabilization in the region. However, more nuanced factors unique to the key individual actors – Saudi Arabia and Israel – are also driving the diplomatic surge.
Fear of Iran’s growing influence over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in the region has driven Saudi’s diplomatic efforts. Saudi officials have displayed uncharacteristic, forefront leadership in seeking a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: intervening in the Palestinian civil strife by bringing together the leaders of Fatah and Hamas in Mecca; pushing for the Arab League approval of its 2002 peace plan initiative. Saudi Arabia, as part of a grouping of moderate Arab states, believes the duration of Palestinian-Israeli violence only strengthens the position of relative extremists in the region; Iran, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein all adopted the Palestinian struggle as a means of gaining popular regional support.
The notion of a collective Arab responsibility for peace is peaking Israel’s interest in the Arab League proposal, which it flatly rejected in 2002. For the last several years, Israel’s leadership has blamed the lack of peace progress on the absence of a viable peace partner – one who is willing and capable of fulfilling agreed to commitments. The involvement of the Arab League with a future Israeli-Palestinian agreement potentially adds that viability, as the bloc may hold enough leverage to ensure the Palestinian side of the bargain is enforced.
Key Obstacles
The Saudi initiative calls for a “just solution” to the Palestinian refugee issue, yet Israeli and Arab interpretations of justice in this matter differ vastly. Arab leaders are insistent that refugees can either return to their home in Israel or settle elsewhere and receive financial compensation from the Israeli government. Israeli officials will not allow Palestinian refugees a right to re-settle in a post-peace agreement Israeli state, but appear partially amenable to a form of financial compensation.
‘ROR’ is an acutely charged issue for much of the Arab public. Significant compromise by the Arab leadership on this seminal matter seems unlikely, as it would draw the harsh rebuke of a large portion of its citizenry, and appear to confirm the extremists’ contention that the moderate Arab states act at the behest of Israel and the US. For the Israeli leadership, ROR undermines a governing, demographic principle: ensuring the Jewish majority of the Jewish state. Some on the extreme end of Israel’s political spectrum also see ROR as a ‘Trojan Horse’ – an Arab attempt to destroy the Israeli state from the inside-out. At this juncture, the best hope for any compromise on either side will lie with the Arab League approved working groups designed to work with ‘international parties’ on finalizing the details of the peace initiative.
The collapse of the Palestinian unity government and a return to civil strife in the Palestinian Territories will also temporarily halt any progress in solving the Palestinian-Israeli or broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Potential indicators of this development include an apparent dissent within Hamas over the group’s move toward political accommodation. Top Hamas officials have privately voiced their disagreement with both the Mecca Accord (Previous Report) and Arab League peace initiative, and local operatives holding Israeli hostage Galid Shalit disagree with the political leadership’s decision to arrange his negotiated release. Moreover, Fatah recently announced the creation of a new 5,000 man military wing, Al Asifa (“The Storm”). Fatah officials describe it as an attempt to strengthen and discipline their decentralized forces, but some in Gaza interpret it as an effort to re-arm for an inevitable rematch against Hamas (source).
