The capture and intelligence exploitation of Abu Faraj al Libbi is likely to have a debilitating short term effect on al-Qaeda?s operational capabilities and tempo, particularly those planned and conducted by al-Qaeda?s core nucleus of leaders and operatives of which al Libbi was a high-ranking member. However, due to the al-Qaeda network’s overall atomization and diffusion throughout a nebulous global web of associated Islamist groups that are likely only minimally affected by al Libbi’s capture, coupled with this nucleus’ resiliency and regenerative dynamics, the operational capabilities and tempo of ‘al Qaeda terrorism’ is likely to rebound relatively quickly. The critical variable in translating the al Libbi capture into dealing a devastating body blow to the al-Qaeda nucleus and degrading its global operations lies in the rapid exploitation of his interrogation for what is hopefully a trove of intelligence on al-Qaeda operations and structure?including the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. Extracted data should help to round up key al-Qaeda leaders and operatives before they have time to take defensive or evasive actions and to interdict operationally mature al-Qaeda attack plans.

Of additional intrigue is al Libbi?s involvement in both of the December 2003 assassination attempts against Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident) and the suspected al-Qaeda threats to the US homeland in the run-up to the 2004 US presidential elections. At the time of the al-Qaeda threats, the Washington Times reported that intelligence indicated that the near-term release of a message from bin Laden would act as the signal for an al-Qaeda assassination of a high-profile political leader, triggering a campaign of terrorist attacks against the US homeland. This particular operational sequencing of an assassination shortly before a major attack against the US mirrors similar al-Qaeda terrorism threat contexts and indicators in 2003 and 2001, and, as theorized by TRC in earlier analyses (see the TRC WAR Reports from December 28, 2003; August 18, 2004; and the October 30 TRC Intel Report) may represent a pattern that would indicate a particular strategic modus operandi and operational sequencing on the part of al-Qaeda in mounting a major attack against the US homeland.