The US military?s targeting of mid-level insurgent operatives in Iraq should prove advantageous in immediate tactical and operational counter-insurgency efforts and in counter-insurgency intelligence gathering. By targeting these operatives, counter-insurgency forces are seeking to remove the most critical nodes that connect the high-level leaders and the street-level fighters and are pivotal in operationalizing directives and strategies from the insurgency leadership.

These mid-level operatives and leaders are likely to be less operationally cellularized than the street fighters, as they would assumedly liaise with segments of the insurgency?s upper leadership echelon and possibly with allied insurgent cells and groups; thus, it would stand to reason, they would have a greater knowledge of and access to the insurgency’s key actors, cells, and operations. As a result, these operatives will likely serve as richer lodes of intelligence if captured, potentially providing information on ongoing operations of the street-fighting cells and on those insurgent leaders from whom they receive guidance.