The recent larger-scale, multi-faceted, and relatively tactically sophisticated insurgent assaults in Iraq against hardened military installations?employing integrated small arms assaults, vehicle bombings, and mortar cover and claimed by al-Qaeda?s terrorist network in Iraq ?demonstrates a rather baffling and peculiar strategic and tactical rationale on the part of insurgents in abandoning the operational advantages of asymmetric warfare and confronting the conventionally superior US and international militaries head-on. This strategic and tactical shift could plausibly be the product of either the insurgents? organizational strength or weakness, but is likely a confluence of:

? a degradation of the Zarqawi network?s leadership, allies, and societal support networks that compel him to mount audacious, ?spectacular? attacks to rally the group?s stature, embolden its operatives, win new recruits, and seek tactical counsel along with a degree of direction to conduct complex guerrilla assaults from his remaining allies of former regime military commanders and intelligence operatives; and