In an update to the December 8, 2004 WAR Report, senior US military officers believe that a more dispersed and cellularized insurgency is likely to conduct more classic guerrilla attacks throughout Iraq and avoid massing in strongholds, which might compel debilitating US and Iraqi offensives against them similar to the recent Fallujah offensive (Intel Report). As the December 8th WAR Report noted that recent ?intelligence indicates that a now more diffuse and cellularized insurgency?deprived of a stronghold sanctuary in which to engineer large bombs, store substantial weapons caches, and plan or stage complex attacks?is now likely to shift its strategy, modus operandi, and targeting preferences? to compensate and increasingly employ terrorist attacks, political assassinations, and intimidation violence against segments of ?the Iraqi populace perceived to be cooperating with the US and Iraqi government agencies that aim to directly coerce US forces and the Iraqi government while avoiding more direct confrontations with the US and allied militaries.? As the Washington Post noted, this ?intimidation effort is blamed for undermining the development of effective Iraqi security forces, particularly local police, as well as inhibiting Iraq?s interim government, restricting economic development and generally fueling perceptions of insecurity.? Since October 1, 2004, 338 Iraqis associated with Iraq?s reconstruction, governing structures, or US forces and agencies have been assassinated–including 35 police chiefs, mayors, and officials.

Former Baathists and regime loyalists seem to have emerged as the key leadership and orchestration echelon within the insurgency, financing a large portion of the insurgency and organizing and directing many attacks. Recent intelligence suggests that these Baathist and regime elements have taken up tactical collaboration with foreign Islamic fighters and terrorists. Because the Baathist and regime loyalists of the insurgency are comprised of known, key individuals, US and Iraqi counter-insurgency strategies and operations are likely calibrated to target them directly with the aim of capturing, killing, or at the very least, coercing them end their insurgent activities.