The recent CIA air strike against a compound in the Pakistan borderlands with Afghanistan , in which US intelligence believed was housing al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri and five senior leaders, is an audacious and potentially profound shot at the upper echelon of al-Qaeda leadership figures. However, such an overt strike within Pakistani territory?particularly one that kills what are now thought to be civilians?carries with it liabilities in its effect on President Pervez Musharraf’s regime and Pakistan?s assistance in the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These potential liabilities are highlighted with the current popular protest within Pakistan against the Musharraf regime because of the strike.
The decision to take a shot at Zawahiri after days of CIA surveillance likely took into account the potential advantageous impact of Zawahiri?s death on al-Qaeda operations, judged against the potentially deleterious effects vis-?-vis Musharraf?s delicate hold on power and Pakistan?s crucial role as an ally in the GWOT. So overt and deadly a US military operation on Pakistani soil was likely to be perceived by Pakistan?s largely anti-US populace as a brazen incursion on Pakistan?s sovereignty, likely stoking popular anger with the Musharraf regime for its operational complicity or impotence in the face of perceived US affronts. Such popular sentiment gives ammunition to a range of both political and militant actors within Pakistan arrayed against Musharraf. As paraphrased from the June 29 WAR Report, Musharraf finds himself compelled to combat al-Qaeda, Taliban , and other Islamist militants operating in his country due to both US pressure to act as part of the GWOT and to Musharraf?s own interests in ensuring his political and personal survival?Islamist terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda have twice attempted to assassinate Musharraf (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident). Yet, Musharraf must avoid unnecessarily provoking militant elements, political powers, and popular sentiment buffeting his grip on power. To avoid exacerbating anti-government sentiment, he has attempted to restrict overt US military operations in Pakistani territory. The Pakistani government?s formal protest may be an attempt at political cover despite possible knowledge of, or involvement in, the strike. While seemingly appreciating the delicate political and power dynamics at play in Pakistan, some US circles have been frustrated with Musharraf?s perceived overly ponderous and restrained counterterrorism efforts against higher value al-Qaeda and Taliban elements in Pakistan; this has likely compelled a more unilateral US approach toward combating these actors.
Overall, the potential near-term gains of an assassination of Zawahiri (or any high value al-Qaeda leadership target) on Pakistani soil must be sounded against the potential long-term detrimental effects of such an operation on Musharraf hold on power?most notably the popular outcry, political maneuvering, and possible militant action against Musharraf that might arise following the operation, with the potential result of a Musharraf regime destabilized or ousted by his domestic foes.
Pakistani officials claim that the strike failed to kill Zawahiri, though US officials have not confirmed his status. The operation has stoked anti-US and anti-Musharraf sentiment within Pakistan. In light of these developments, an examination of the potential impact on al-Qaeda operations of Zawahiri?s assassination is warranted.
If Zawahiri, and reportedly five senior leaders of al-Qaeda, were confirmed to have been killed by the CIA air strike, their deaths would likely, in the near-term, land a stunning body blow against the collective psyche and morale of the al-Qaeda network and possibly disrupt or forestall terrorist operations and planning being conducted by cadres of the network in operational contact with Zawahiri and the leaders. However, because of the devolution of al-Qaeda (discussed at length in TRC WAR Reports over the past year) into a globally atomized network of Islamist terrorist cells, operating entrepreneurially in the service of al-Qaeda?s strategic goals but not necessarily commanded by Zawahiri or the al-Qaeda leadership coterie, coupled with Zawahiri?s eroding level of command and control of operations, Zawahiri?s death is unlikely to have a profound long-term degrading or debilitating effect on the global terrorist operations of the al-Qaeda movement. The new form of al-Qaeda, considering the built-in modes of understudy and succession among its leaders and their lieutenants, has made the network resilient to the elimination of its leaders. Thus, the engine driving the expansion and entrepreneurial operations of the al-Qaeda network is the virulent purchase of the ideological worldview and call to arms of jihadist philosophy. In a similar vein, the core strategic contours and agenda of the al-Qaeda jihadist ideology is well and widely articulated in various bin Laden and Zawahiri communiqu?s and has proliferated and become ensconced within the collective consciousness of the Islamist and jihadist communities.
Because Zawahiri is considered by many experts to be a preeminent ideologue and grand strategist and an operational planner or liaison with certain jihadist cadres and commanders closely aligned with the core nucleus of leaders and operatives, his death would likely have significant near-term effects on the agility and refinement of al-Qaeda strategy and on al-Qaeda core operations. However, in the longer term, his death would be unlikely to have significant degrading effect on operations because of his seemingly eroding command and control role within the network as it expands around the globe with more autonomous an entrepreneurial groups and cells and as he continues to be harried and isolated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. Overall, the increasingly entrepreneurial al-Qaeda network has succeeded the strategic and operational relevance of its founders.
In addition, the assassination of Zawahiri at the hands of the US would undoubtedly be perceived as martyrdom and would likely rally vengeful riposte attacks by jihadists out of fealty and homage to Zawahiri and also to demonstrate the continued operational potency of the al-Qaeda movement.
In conclusion, weighing the potential advantageous and disadvantages of the strike was surely a difficult and sobering exercise. It would seem that the near-term gains of attempting to kill Zawahiri would worth the long-term liabilities, particularly if the US thought that Musharraf could do more to combat operationally active al-Qaeda elements in his territory, including those targeted by the strike. However, long-term global counterterrorism strategies must take into account the stability of a key ally in the GWOT.
