There are three factors that led Israel to support Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his policy of unilateral measures:
1) the demographic advantage of Palestinians over Israelis;
2) the perceived absence of a viable Palestinian peace partner; and
3) the hard-line political personality and personal history of Ariel Sharon.
While the multiple strokes he suffered have produced a level of uncertainty regarding the future direction of Israeli politics, these three factors still exist, and the most likely course of action by Israel will be a continued unilateralist policy led by Sharon?s Kadima Party, culminating in a calculated disengagement from the West Bank.
Given the level of the Palestinian population and its high birthrate compared to Israel, it became clear that the territory controlled by the Israeli government would have more Palestinians than Israelis in the near future. It would, henceforth, be exceedingly untenable to maintain the Jewish character of a state in which Israeli Jews were a minority. Additionally, in the wake of the failed Arafat-Barak-Clinton peace negotiations in 2000 and the subsequent rise of the second Intifida, many Israelis came to believe that the Palestinian leadership did not represent a viable peace partner.
At some point early in his five-year reign as prime minister, Sharon acknowledged these factors and began a series of unilateral measures that culminated in the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Without Ariel Sharon, it is unlikely that the Israeli government would have engaged in such a bold policy. If Sharon?the active proponent of the settlement movement, the architect of the ?Operation Peace for Galilee? invasion into Lebanon, the man held indirectly responsible by his own government for the massacre of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila, the head of conservative Likud, the ?Hammer,? the ?Butcher??felt it was necessary to raze settlements and concede territory to the Palestinians in the face of continued terrorist attacks, then the hesitant portions of the Israeli population would support him and the policy.
Though currently without a clearly elicited platform, Kadima has adopted the slogan ?Sharon?s Way.? The details of Sharon?s ?Final Act? regarding the West Bank is unknown, but it is valid to assume the same factors that were the impetus for the Gaza withdrawal would hold true in the West Bank. It is likely he envisioned a calculated withdrawal, which keeps large, established settlements that encircle all of Jerusalem as Israeli territory. It is also, therefore, likely that Kadima?with our without Sharon?would pursue a policy along the same lines.
Certainly, there are still multiple variables whose outcome will impact significantly the makeup of the future Israeli government and its policy, including: the cohesion of the Kadima party under the leadership of Ehud Olmert; the results of the Palestinian elections and the subsequent policy and capabilities of the Palestinian Authority; and the degree of security experienced by the Israeli population.
Yet, regardless of Sharon?s death, partial recovery, or full recovery, Kadima is still in the driver?s seat of Israeli politics. Kadima is the result of Sharon capturing the centrist position, and the realist underpinnings of the centrist position continue to be generally accepted among Israelis: territorial concessions are inevitable for peace and for maintaining the Jewish character of Israel, and withdrawal should be done unilaterally and in a manner advantageous to the state of Israel. Moreover, invoking the image of a deceased or suffering leader to gain support for a party and policy has long been a powerful political tool. It is certain that the political personality of Sharon will be an enduring presence in Israeli politics, and it is likely Kadima will lead Israel in a policy of unilateral disengagement from the West Bank.
