The GovExec article provides a review of the creation of the Preparedness Directorate and notes the first set of guidelines produced by the newly formed directorate. The purpose of the guidelines is to aid federal authorities in protecting First Responders from the effects of radiation during a radiological incident and to provide guidelines and a process for site cleanup. The development of these guidelines followed the federally-sponsored exercise Top Officials-2 Exercise (TOPOFF-2) in Seattle, Washington from May 12-16, 2003. The exercise highlighted a number of issues in federal radiological emergency response and recovery. One of the most important concerns raised was how long-term site restoration and cleanup would be accomplished following an act of radiological terrorism. Following the TOPOFF-2 exercise, DHS tasked an interagency working group to address these issues. The working group consisted of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) in radiological/nuclear emergency preparedness, response, and consequence management. Numerous federal departments and agencies expected have expertise in dealing with the aftermath of a radiological incident were represented in the working group, which released consensus guidance in June 2004 for the clean up and restoration of a site following a terrorist attack using a nuclear or radiological device. Representatives from 13 state agencies with expertise in radiological response reviewed this guidance. Their suggested changes were incorporated into the newly released guidelines.
The intended audience for the guidelines is principally federal emergency response planners; however, it could useful to state and local governments for their response planning.
As the article points out, these draft guidelines represent DHS?s first comprehensive attempt to outline what steps First Responders should employ during the early, intermediate, and later stages of a terrorist attack involving a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or an improvised nuclear devise (IND). There is a wide range of possible consequences?all of them bad?that may result from an RDD or IND, depending upon the type and size of the device, the type and quantity of radioactive material, and dispersion. The consequences of an RDD may range from a small, localized area (e.g., a street, single building, or city block) to large areas, conceivably several square miles. However, most experts agree that the likelihood of a large impacted area is low. In most plausible scenarios, the radioactive material would not result in acutely harmful radiation doses. Conversely, the consequences of an IND are much more severe and devastating. An IND is a nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear state or can be a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear explosion. An IND would result in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of infrastructure, and contamination of a very large area. Both scenarios produce potentially lethal radioactive fallout that will require long-term restoration and clean up.
DHS should be commended for the continued to effort to prepare the nation for dealing with consequences of this type of catastrophic attack. However, much more work needs to be done. As was highlighted during Hurricane Katrina (WAR Report), it is now up to local and state agencies to take these guidelines and craft the response plans for an attack by terrorist using an RDD or IND in their jurisdictions. Then, these plans must be exercised with federal agencies to determine where the shortcomings and flaws are. The newly created Preparedness Directorate needs to take the lead, providing funding and working with the states and local agencies to insure this takes place.