Iraq
The future ferocity and durability of Iraq?s ongoing insurgency, its national cohesion and stability, and its overall renaissance center on the following key drivers:
(1) the degree of commitment from the ethno-religious communities?Sunnis, Kurds, and Shia?to an ?Iraqi? pluralist and civic nationalist identity and political project;
(2) the degree of sectarian militia activity and violence; and
(3) the counter-insurgency faculties and allegiances of Iraqi security forces.
The forming of the next government in Iraq will represent a fulcrum period in the strength of the insurgency and Iraq?s national cohesion, stability, and renaissance. The linchpin of these issues is the commitment of the Sunni community and the more moderate and politically oriented Sunni insurgents to the political structures and mechanisms in Iraq. In particular, it is the level to which Sunnis regard the political arena as a viable and durable avenue of pursuing and safeguarding Sunni interests and rights. This decision, if sweetened with enticements by the government for Sunni political insurgents to lay down their weapons, should prove advantageous in both sapping the insurgency of what seemingly is its core rank, and in isolating the politically implacable foreign jihadist elements from Sunni insurgent and societal operational support. Thus, it is critical that a majority of Sunnis perceive the most recent elections as legitimate. Further, an additional factor affecting the stability of the Iraq political process and the Sunni participation therein is the ability of Sunnis to accept their political minority status.
Equally important is the commitment of the Shia and Kurd-dominated government and political blocs, freed from the jackboot of the Hussein regime, to the good-faith inclusion of the Sunni political bloc, as well as a more nationally centralized, pluralist, and cohesive government. Should Sunnis become disillusioned with Iraq?s political arena?due to a lack of voice therein, general dysfunction, or a perceived persecution at the hands of the dominant Shia and Kurd political blocs?Sunnis will likely be driven more squarely to support and fuel the insurgency.
Thus, overall, Iraq?s future hinges on the ability of both sides to adopt a more civic nationalist creed and collaborative approach transcendent of divisive parochial ethnic and religious sectarian interests and resolve disputes for the ?national good? within the necessarily compromising political arena, rather than by the gun or bomb of sectarian militias. The cultivation of such a civic nationalist identity and creed will represent a daunting, but trenchant, test of the capacity of Iraqi society to coalesce and move forward as one nation.
As the December 21, 2005 WAR Report, among others, noted, ?the second linchpin in Iraq?s political and national stability centers on the continued activities of sectarian militias. Reports have indicated that a significant number of Shia militiamen have infiltrated the Iraqi internal security services and are alleged to have menaced Sunnis. As TRC assessments have noted in recent months, the activities of sectarian militias, particularly those associated with Shia political blocks and the national security forces, pose arguably the greatest long-term threat to Iraq?s stability and cohesion. These militias not only add relatively rogue and dangerous militant actors to the already quasi-anarchy of Iraq, but would also seem poised to underpin ethno-religious sectarian tensions and distrust with violent actions. This would compel a retreat by most ethno-religious groups into an aggressively defensive posture and likely catalyze sectarian conflict and possibly civil war?Thus, it remains critical for Iraq?s renaissance and stability that both the Sunni community?including its insurgent elements?be enticed and included in the political processes by the Shia and Kurd political parties and that the Iraqi government endeavor to disarm and demobilize the remaining sectarian militias.?
The final key driver is the development of Iraqi security forces with the faculties, resolve, and general allegiance to the central government necessary to combat the insurgency effectively. Until then, US troops will be required to provide direction and muscle against the insurgency, and thus, will remain in Iraq at robust levels and serve as a continued irritant and rallying cause for both foreign jihadist fighters and Iraqi nationalist insurgents.
Together, the potential disillusionment of Sunnis to a political arena perceived as persecutory against them and their possible retreat to a classic insurgency activities and support, the menacing activities of sectarian militias, and the potential overriding interests of the Shia and Kurds for their provincial autonomy seems to set Iraq in 2006 on the cusp of possible civil war and/or its fracturing into ethnic-religious provinces.
Afghanistan
The formation of Afghanistan?s first parliament in over three decades represents a heartening fulcrum period in Afghanistan?s renaissance. As a kaleidoscopic array of legislators?warlords, women, Communists, etc.?come together to govern Afghanistan, the degree of their commitment and embrace of civic nationalism, political cooperation, and pluralism over parochial ethnic and ideological interests, much like the challenges facing Iraq (see this WAR Report), will largely dictate Afghanistan?s political stability and development. Legislative bickering, obstructionism, or general dysfunction will likely paralyze much needed nation-building initiatives. In a similar vein, it remains crucial that the Afghan government extend its writ throughout the hinterland to establish security, provide government services, and spur development.
A particular potential destabilizing element in Afghanistan?s political and security milieu is the presence and activities of warlords?both inside and outside the Afghan parliament?whose contentment with pursuing interests and resolving grievances exclusively within the political arena, rather than via warlordism, remains to be seen.
In addition, recent reports indicate a reinvigoration of the Taliban and the insurgency in Afghanistan, with a suggested infusion of fighters, materiel, and expertise, possibly from Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds across the border in Pakistan (see this WAR Report), foreign mujihedeen, and/or veteran militants from the insurgency in Iraq. Such an infusion of fighters, materiel, and Iraq insurgency-honed ?state-of-the-art? terrorist tradecraft expertise will likely enhance both the operational capabilities and resiliency of the Taliban and the insurgency in Afghanistan. A key challenge for Afghan and US forces in 2006 will be confronting a reinvigorated insurgency along with stemming its possible staging ground in Pakistan and lifelines to foreign terrorist supporters and recruits.
Finally, it remains critical that the general reconstruction and development initiatives begin to take hold in Afghanistan, particularly in beginning to offer Afghan society greater prosperity, as well as to establish a more diversified economy to wean the nation from its insidious dependence upon the unsustainable, destabilizing, corrupting, and sullying revenue from drug production.
