Port security is an issue that has long been overlooked. It has never been a priority in national security policy until 9/11 at which time the seemingly unimaginable method of attack sensitized bureaucrats to the seriousness of terrorist threat possibilities. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and subsequent transfer of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Border Patrol to the Department, fostered a new way of thinking in terms of securing our borders. It is now realized that border security has a maritime nexus and reaches far beyond our coastline. The traditional focus of drug and alien smuggling interdiction now gives way to the possibility that terrorists may use existing smuggling infrastructure to move personnel and resources to and from the United States. As serious as this is, the greater concern is that terrorist may smuggle a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) into the country by maritime vessel. Closer to home, the threat directly against a port stakeholder is another primary concern. Naval assets, cruise ships, ferries, sport-fishing vessels, and other excursion-type tour boats are vulnerable to a variety of terrorist tactics.
Although the problem exists in U.S. ports nationwide, this article specifically discusses the Port of San Diego and how Department of Homeland Security Agencies throughout the community have come together to address the issue and minimize the threat to all stakeholder assets.
There are a multitude of terrorist groups and threats to be concerned with in and around San Diego. Two issues unique to the area and complicating the matter include San Diego’s geo- graphic setting on the Mexico border and a large population of immigrants (both legal and illegal) of Middle Eastern origin. Both variables pose challenges to security planners.
First, a complex array of transnational smuggling infrastructure emerging from outside the western hemisphere connecting to networks already well ingrained in South and Central America pro- vide terrorist groups with logistical support with which they can enter the United States relatively unchallenged. This system facilitates a platform for funding, money laundering, and fraudulent document acquisition and provides terrorists with a base of operations. Of particular concern is the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay that has a large number of known Hizbollah and Hamas members operating freely. In November 2002, top terrorist operatives met in the region to plan attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in the Western Hemisphere. Given the extent of criminal enterprises operating from tri-border bases and extending into the U.S., the potential for terrorist gaining access to smuggling routes and methods should be cause for grave concern.
Criminal organizations and corruption in countries south of the U.S. border also facilitate opportunities for terrorist groups. Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Mexico all have powerful crime syndicates with maritime assets readily at their disposal, and they routinely engage in smuggling illegal cargo destined for the United States. Once the cargo reaches Mexico, the porous land and maritime border with the U.S. provides many routes easily penetrated by smugglers.
The second challenge facing the community is that San Diego has approximately 50,000 resi- dents of Middle Eastern decent and an undetermined population of illegal residents. It must be clarified that most of these residents are refugees fleeing persecution and are generally pro- American in their political views. Kurds, Chaldean, Shiites, Arabs, and others comprise the makeup of the local Middle Eastern populace. There are, however, radical elements mingled in the population, and three of the 9/11 terrorists–Nawaf Alhazmi, Hani Hanjour, and Khalid Almihdhar–all may have had San Diego connections or received support from the community while living in the local area.
There has been debate concerning who may have known that the hijackers were on a terrorist mission; nonetheless, supportive resources were in place for them to utilize while awaiting orders to carry out their attack. It is almost certain that sleeper cells and/or associated resources are still operating in San Diego. It has been widely speculated that at least two of these terrorists were initially here to conduct surveillance or to lead an attack on a U.S. Naval asset in the Port of San Diego. This is a widely accepted possibility, but to date no direct evidence has been provided to support the theory. Investigators and intelligence analysts continue to sort through details but may never categorically know the original purpose for the terrorists association in San Diego. One thing is certain: their purpose for being in the United States was one of aggression.
San Diego Bay is located about 96 nautical miles southeast of Los Angeles and just north of the United States-Mexico border. It is only a few miles from the major city of Tijuana, Mexico and is 135 miles from Mexicali, Mexico. San Diego’s close proximity to the open ocean and low levels of shipping congestion make it an excellent location for cargo shipping. The port has two cargo terminals and one cruise ship terminal. In addition, there are several marinas, piers, and recreational facilitates, and the San Diego airport is adjacent to the maritime port. Finally, San Diego County is home to one of the largest naval complexes in the world with over $400 billion in U.S. Naval as- sets positioned in the Port of San Diego. Among those assets are nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
Local cruise ship activity, airport location, and naval assets make San Diego Bay a target rich environment for terrorists. Historical events indicate that terrorists view these types of locations as priorities for attack. Additionally, there are commercial vessels entering the harbor daily with the potential of becoming targets. Although San Diego does not have the commercial shipping base as Los Angeles, an attack on any commercial maritime vessel at any location would have a huge economic impact, as it affects shipping worldwide. Lastly, the city of San Diego, including the downtown area, is in very close proximity to the port. A major terrorist event in the harbor would likely affect the city.
A number of threat scenarios are being considered, but based on intelligence evaluated from a variety of sources, five scenarios stand out as the most likely possibilities inside the port.
First, the rogue ship scenario is of major concern to port security planners. If a large, deep draft vessel were to be taken over by a terrorist group, it could be used to enter the port and ram a nuclear carrier or simply be sunken in the middle of the channel. The for- mer could be catastrophic if radioactive contamination were to be released in the harbor.
The latter would tie up traffic into and out of the harbor, including vessels of the U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet, which could be in port.
Another possibility with disastrous potential is a hijacked airliner crashing into a nuclear asset, once again causing environmental contamination. The resulting death and destruction from this type uncontrollable contamination would be cataclysmic and the affect long term.
A third likelihood is a small boat attack as demonstrated by the USS Cole incident in Yemen and the failed attempt against the USS Sullivans. Some force protection experts consider this scenario of the leading possibilities, and they work feverishly to mitigate this threat. An explosive laden small boat can swiftly and stealthily enter a naval security zone. Although security has been greatly enhanced around naval vessels, cruise ships, and commercial vessels, no security assets exist on the water to intercept or prevent a small boat attack.
Fourth, offensive dive operations could be employed to place explosives or mines in or around naval or commercial vessels.
Fifth, a hijacked cruise ship could be used as a rogue ship, become victim to a biological or chemical attack, or result in casualties from direct action. It would result in severe eco- nomic devastation to the industry.
The possible scenarios for a terrorist attack in the Port of San Diego are far too many to note. The list for critical infrastructure located in or around the Port of San Diego numbers in the dozens. One basic understanding of protective service is that, if an attacker wants to assail your principle, they will likely do so; however, it is incumbent on the security planner to deter and minimize the threat as much as possible. To be prepared for anything at anytime is a large order but by being better trained, equipped, and informed than the adversary, you are placed one step ahead in the process.
The United States Coast Guard, Activities San Diego has taken the lead in port security within San Diego Bay, the adjacent coastline and on inland waterways and dams in its area of responsibility. With the allocation of funds and operational assets, the Coast Guard has been able to de- ploy additional units and manpower in support of homeland security missions in the port. The unit recently received two new 87-foot Coast Guard Cutters, two new small boat assets, and access to other tactical units to support mission requirements.
Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 9 02 mandates the formation of a Port Security Committee (PSC) to address port security needs. In San Diego, the Captain of the Port chairs this committee and is organized by an assembly of subcommittees including a Law Enforcement SubCommittee, an Intelligence Subcommittee, and a Port Readiness Subcommittee. The PSC has been an extremely successful organization in terms of establishing relationships, defining responsibilities, and sharing information among stakeholders. It should also be noted that through this committee, the San Diego community benefits from a strong network of resources cooperation.
The premier enhancement of security operations in the Port of San Diego is the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC), which is in the process of development and scheduled to be fully operational by November 2003. This is a joint Coast Guard and Navy project costing in the millions but will serve as a prototype for other U.S. ports.
The JHOC concept will allow multiple federal and local agencies to come under one umbrella in terms of security planning and information exchange in and around the port. Agencies currently involved in the project include the Coast Guard, Navy, and San Diego Harbor Police. The intent is
to add US Customs (BICE) Air and Marine Unit, US Border Patrol Marine Enforcement Unit, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and potentially other port stakeholders.
From a technical perspective, there will be an integrated port surveillance system comprised of remotely controlled video cameras, various types of sensors to monitor vessel traffic or other types of activity, and mobile tracking devices to identify the location of friendly forces. These re- sources will be managed by a command and control system called Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) system and, although classified in nature, an unclassified ver- sion will allow access by local agencies.
Numerous law enforcement database resources along with various classified and unclassified computer systems will also support the JHOC. Furthermore, the Coast Guard is modernizing local intelligence resources that will provide direct support to the JHOC from a Tactical Maritime Intelligence Center (TMIC). The TMIC will serve as a platform for information exchange and intelligence continuity among JHOC member agencies, insuring all participants have access to data surrounding port or maritime concerns.
Finally, the port received a federal grant of over $1 million to enhance security measures. Another award is likely to be received for FY2004. Part of this grant will implement security measures in support of the JHOC.
The multi-faceted requirements of security planning in the Port of San Diego require an in-depth understanding that terrorist attack planning has reached new heights. No longer is hijacking, ransom, or extortion the goal of terrorists, it is murder, an all out war against the concept of democracy, and a hatred for America and all that it stands for. We are now faced with radical extremism that knows no boundaries and places no limitations on methods of reaching their objectives. We must be prepared to think “out of the box” in terms of what the threat is. In San Diego, the process is well on its way to success.
WORKS CITED
“Who Did It: FBI Links Names to Terror Attacks.” [Online] ABC News, 2003. Cited 7 August 2003. Available from
Boettcher, Mike. “Terrorist Meeting In South America’s ‘tri-border’ Area.” [Online] CNN, 2002. Cited 8 August 2003. Available from
