Series Introduction
The current administration has a unique opportunity to reorient the United States’ strategic approach toward China and the South China Sea conflict, placing the U.S. and its allies on a path to an ideal resolution. To achieve this end, the US should replace the recent reactive, myopic, and compartmentalized approach with a proactive, long-term, and comprehensive strategy oriented towards achieving the best possible outcome for US national security interests. The U.S. has failed to take action to preserve and advance its interests during this ongoing conflict despite the unprecedented knowledge and analytic capability available to U.S. leadership through subject expertise within government agencies and think tank organizations. A troubling misunderstanding of China continues to plague the U.S. government, resulting in errors in policy and action towards China’s recent actions.
This analysis aims to place potential U.S. foreign policy responses to Beijing’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea area into the context of the Chinese frame of reference and U.S. objectives. Ultimately, appropriate policies and actions in East Asia should flow from the bottom line objective of US security and economic interests. Relevant policies, alliances, relationships, and all means of influence projections must be developed to reach and maintain these objectives. This discussion will first describe the situation in the South China Sea, and seek to re-evaluate implicit assumptions in recent US government actions.
Through a careful revision and examination of assumptions, the U.S. government will be able to craft policies that will help achieve its desired end states. Simultaneously, however, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is pursuing ends contrary to U.S. objectives within the same space. As with any policy of this nature, therefore, the U.S. must contend with the subject country, the PRC, to achieve its goals. With this in mind, advances in U.S. objectives must be achieved within the context of the least amount of conflict with China.
Only by understanding the PRC’s nature and assumptions can the U.S. gain insight into why and how Beijing makes decisions and discover the strengths and weaknesses of its framework to maximize its success. Understanding the Chinese perspective and its resulting decision-making calculus will allow the U.S. to effectively align its actions towards the best outcome to the dispute given its regional objectives. After this, the second part of this series will posit recommendations regarding what U.S. end states in the region might look like, and a path for pursuing these end states with the nature of the adversary in view.
Outside of government-level policy making, the discussion is also relevant to private-sector decision makers. If properly understood and implemented, this formula may help put the U.S. in a more advantageous position in East Asia over the course of the next decade. The order of the aforementioned schema is vital, for only by reassessing and correcting where we have been and currently are can an ideal way forward be determined.
Part I: Breaking the Mirror
The first of the part of the approach towards China is encapsulated in the phrase “breaking the mirror.” This is a reference to “mirror imaging” in decision-making processes, a common analytic concept. The primary idea is that you and your adversary likely hold differing presuppositions and worldviews. Each point of reference inevitably affects decision making and makes itself felt at lower levels of abstraction and in physical events. Students and analysts working in international relations or political science study the history, culture, and language of other nations. This is done based on the assumption, likely well-held, that knowledge gained in these studies will give insight into the map of understanding through which the peoples of different nations conceive themselves and their relationship to the world.
Projecting your presuppositions and worldview onto an adversary, explicitly or implicitly, can be catastrophic, and can harm tactical and strategic decisions in the face of an adversary who understands you. This can be remedied through understanding an adversary on their own terms, by delving into the cultural and philosophical undercurrents which lay at the base of political theory, military doctrine, and foreign policy endeavors.
The Dispute
Maritime disputes in the East Asian sea have persisted for the US since at least the late 19th century. Over time, China has gained control over key island formations throughout the region, the most significant being the Paracel islands in 1974, and then the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Tensions and competing claims of sovereignty over the space reached a new peak when Beijing began printing all maps with the infamous “nine dash” line which outlines roughly 80 percent of the South China Sea as Chinese territory. The greatest significance of the “nine dash line” is that it includes within its arbitrary demarcation the Spratly Islands, a lose collection of fourteen islands which are a located in the far south. Previous claims by China in the area never included these islands. These claims were followed by large numbers of Chinese “fishing boats” in the area, as well as an escalated PLA Navy presence. China has also established man-made islands throughout the region, on which it has built fortified ports and military-grade facilities.
These actions are in direct conflict with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the PRC has signed. The UNCLOS stipulates that nations have territorial claims up to twelve nautical miles from its own coast, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for fishing and natural resource mining up to 200 nautical miles from its shoreline. China has made vague claims to “historical” precedent to support its claims. This precedent, however, refers to little more than a single uncorroborated document, making the claim little more than a public relations stunt allowing Beijing to distract the international community.
Some commentators have described Beijing as taking a “salami slice” approach towards its South China Sea encroachments, gradually achieving its goals through actions that remain below the threshold of meaningful retributive action by other nation states. While Chinese militarization and fortification of this zone has been incremental, the official claiming of this are as PRC territory was not; Beijing made a single sweeping claim of all territory within its “nine dash” line all at once and unapologetically.
Aside from the man-made islands, there are three major natural island formations within the disputed regions. These include the Paracel Islands, the Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratly Islands. Beijing has controlled the Paracel Islands since 1974, against the continued protests of Vietnam. Chinese vessels have occupied the Scarborough Shoal since 2012, in the face of petitions from the Philippines to the Hague’s International Court of Arbitration. The major significance of the “nine dash” line, aside from its disregard for international law and the claims of neighboring countries to thousands of nautical miles, is that it publicly signals China’s intention to possess the Spratly islands. The creation of military installations and ports on these islands, which is currently likely, would give China an unprecedented ability to project its naval power to the East, South, and West.
From a geopolitical perspective, the stretches of water and land formations comprise the sea lanes through which trillions of dollars in overseas trade traverse annually. In addition, China has claimed the right to portions of the area known to contain valuable resources, including massive natural gas reserves under the sea bed, as well as vast fishing areas.
Ideas Acting on the Chinese Decision Maker
Some ideas are embedded so deep into the substrata of Chinese culture, that Chinese decision makers are inevitably influenced by them when prescribing action and forming policy. The idea of harmony, internal balance, and external balance is a fundamental aspect of Chinese consciousness, growing out of its regional tradition and the teachings of Confucianism. These ideas have been used recently in national narratives as well. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has leveraged these ideas as tools to maintain domestic and regional stability in order to protect the party’s rule. Recognizing the continued influence of these ideas that may have fallen out of mind for many Western analysts when Xi Jinping took power, may proliferate a more robust understanding of the cultural forces at work driving decision making.
The Confucius concept of harmony, particularly social harmony, relies on entities in community with each other in the same space knowing their place in the natural order and thriving relative to the conditions of that role. According to Chinese tradition, Confucius taught, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.” (Analects XII, 11, trans. Legge) The PRC government views China as naturally holding the dominant regional position and, in order for harmony to exist, all other nations must take their place relative to China’s regional hegemony.
On the surface, it appears that Xi Jinping’s domestic and foreign priorities have not been as influenced by these ancient Confucius concepts to the extent of his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao regularly evoked the concept of a harmonious society that included a foreign policy emphasizing compromise and dialogue with China’s neighbors to achieve regional balance and harmony toward common goals relative to China’s dominant role. Xi Jinping’s foreign policy clearly takes a more aggressive approach. Regardless of these differences, however, both Chinese leaders have not departed from the shared Confucius principles, even if their manifestation takes less explicit forms.
One key aspect of Beijing’s desire for geo-political balance is its desire for land and maritime power parity. Here, Beijing may be seeking to balance its sizable regional land power with an equal measure of sea space for security. The ability to symmetrically project military power on both sea and land may also be rooted in this idea of balance. While taking a different appearance, the idea of balancing different kinds of territorial spaces (land and sea) is best understood in the context of these cultural concepts. In order to shape effective policy, the U.S. must maintain an understanding of these underlying values instead of addressing symptomatic manifestations on an ad hoc basis
More concretely, the PRC currently relies heavily on exports as it struggles to transition from a manufacturing and export dominated economy to a consumer economy. Essential to continuing this lifeline is control over the sea lanes surrounding the Chinese coastline. Beijing fears any foreign control over these critical channels, especially those with interest in gaining diplomatic and economic leverage over it.
Another factor in policy-making calculus is the time spectrum on which Chinese leaders consider plans. The Chinese understanding rests within a long historical and cultural consciousness. This stands in stark contrast to the relatively short history and political foresight of the United States. This difference influences perspective and strategic planning. This perspective gives China a strategic advantage from a psychological perspective relative to the United States. If your adversary is consistently planning five steps ahead instead of your two, he is more likely to achieve success in the long run. U.S. policy makers must, therefore, plan further ahead to gain a competitive parity against their counterparts in the PRC.
While these examples may help a nascent understanding of the Chinese point of view, this coverage is limited. Understanding the stark socio-cultural variances that have shaped the two nations over time is essential in crafting a solution to the South China Sea tensions. The next section will explore how the current head of the PRC government, the Chinese Communist Party, prioritizes its foreign policy objectives and orders its actions towards these goals.
CCP Desired End States and Examples of Corresponding Decisions
Preservation of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the current PRC government’s political priority. In Clausewitzian terms, this is estimated as the source of Beijing’s “will to act.” Furthermore, Beijing likely believes this continuation is guaranteed primarily through internal stability. This, in turn, is believed to be sustained through continued economic growth and via expansion. This understanding is the basic general consensus of foreign policy experts regarding the ideas which drive PRC foreign policy decisions.
Understanding that the desired end states of the CCP are different from US political parties, is crucial. Continuous economic growth and expansion is viewed as a means of maintaining its power, as Beijing likely considers it essential for maintaining a healthy balance to a large and growing population and recent domestic socio-economic structural unease. Again, this is largely based on a Confucius concept of harmony central to Chinese thought. Creating an environment where current and future economic investments and relationships can be guaranteed is, therefore, linked directly with the PRC’s most fundamental aim and its cultural values.
This link means that, in terms of foreign policy, China emphasizes stability, balance, and the development of relationships that will continue to grow their economy over the long term. In contrast, the U.S. is interested in states which will adhere to the idea of rule of law and friendly states that follow norms established by Western power structures. This is a key strategic difference. This calculation drives the “One Belt, One Road” foreign investment and influence plan as well as actions aimed at shifting the Chinese economy from one which relies primarily on manufacturing to one that leverages its massive consumer base. China likely believes that gaining more territory will allow it to secure continued economic growth, achieve better security, and project its power and influence throughout the South Pacific.
Simultaneously, China knows it knows it cannot currently challenge U.S. naval power. This, it relies on positive relations with other states to prevent a full naval blockade of vital sea lanes. In the long term, the PRC is orienting the doctrine, structure, and resources of the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA), which includes its Navy, to ensure its economic stability and growth. Military preparation and growth will, in its view, bolster the economy and internal stability, therefore securing CCP rule. In other words, it is formulating plans at the operational and tactical levels which are consistent with its broader aims. This kind of posture is currently being rehearsed on a micro-scale within the nine dash line that the PRC has claimed and backed with military installations on manmade islands, and PLA Navy patrols.
The PRC also continues to leverage its presence in the information domain to achieve its goals. Findings suggest that China continues to leverage computer network exploitation operations to steal proprietary information in order to save millions in research and development costs. It can in turn use these saved funds to bolster other parts of its armed forces and infrastructure. It also uses cyber espionage for traditional government-focused espionage, allowing it to gain a strategic information advantage against its adversaries, including the U.S.
Perhaps the most impressive maneuver is how Beijing has wielded its strong economic position in tandem with diplomacy to lure neighboring states into attractive economic partnerships with China in exchange for concessions. For example, in October 2016 the PRC foreign ministry successfully achieved friendly agreements after the two foreign ministers met and made economic deals. After the visit, President Duterte of the Philippines publically displayed warmth and economic interest China, while taking a harsher tone towards the of the U.S.
Conclusion
China’s mastery of strategic planning relative to their desired end states, and the matching of operational and tactical courses of action to these ends, stands in stark contrast to the relative failure of U.S. policy-in-action regarding the South China Sea situation. As has been briefly discussed, Chinese values, reflected in objectives and decision making processes, differ significantly from those of their U.S. counterparts. Understanding an adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, relative to your own, is crucial. Before proposing possible desired end states for the U.S. in East Asia, this series will work to demonstrate how the current trajectory will almost certainly negatively impact U.S. interests. This will allow for more ideal shaping of policy to secure U.S. interests. The next installment in this series will analyze current policy and seek to formulate reasonable end states. Finally, it will propose tactical, strategic, and operational paths toward an ideal resolution of this conflict.
