Highlights
-General David McKiernan replaced by Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal
-Leadership change comes as violence expected to increase
-Counterinsurgency lessons learned in Iraq are likely to be applied to Afghanistan
Nearly eight years after the United States (US) launched a major counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban militants remain a potent force and are predicted to escalate their war against Afghan security forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers in 2009.
By establishing a solid base in northwest Pakistan, Taliban militants were able to rearm and regroup in Afghanistan, posing a major challenge to the stability of the country. The failure to stabilize Afghanistan was likely a major factor in the recent decision by US Central Command leader General David Petraeus to replace General David McKiernan with Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal as senior commander in country.
The move to replace McKiernan comes as the Taliban is launching its annual spring offensive. Violence is expected to increase more than 50 percent in some areas. Continued high-levels of violence and the naming of a new commander is indicative of the ineffective strategy so far used to stabilize Afghanistan. The shake-up signifies both a change of personnel and a broader rethink of America’s eight year engagement. While Lieutenant General McChrystal is unlikely to stem rising Taliban violence in the near to mid-term, his appointment marks a major change strategy.
Escalating Violence
The US military is expecting a 50 percent increase in violence throughout Afghanistan, driven mostly by an uptick in roadside bombs and suicide attacks. Joint Task Force Paladin Col. Jeffrey Jarkowsky predicts bomb attacks in 2009 will reach 5,700, up from 3,800 in 2008. Roadside and suicide bombings are already up 25 percent in the first four months of 2009 compared to the same period last year. The dramatic rise in attacks and the insurgents’ growing skill in placing and camouflaging the bombs will further complicate the US mission.
•Evidence of the Taliban’s growing skill and sophistication was seen on May 12, 2009 when up to a dozen suicide bombers staged synchronized attacks on government buildings in the provincial capital of Khost province. The attack triggered a six-hour battle between militants and NATO forces, leaving at least 20 dead. The assault was reminiscent of several previous attacks and indicative of the deteriorating security situation.
The heaviest fighting in Afghanistan generally occurs in the spring and summer months when the snow in the mountains has melted and insurgents are able to use funds from their poppy harvest. The Taliban will remain most active in the eastern and southern provinces, specifically Kandahar and Helmand. We note that recent Taliban statements suggest escalating violence is likely in western Afghanistan, as militants are vowing to take the war into new regions. The growing sophistication in Taliban attacks and enhanced influence suggests the organization will be successful in spreading its war to new provinces in the near to medium-term.
Strategy Shift
Escalating violence in Afghanistan and a resurging Taliban is indicative of the US need to shift its strategy in the country. Thus far, the US/NATO strategy in fighting the Taliban has failed, with responsibility largely falling on General McKiernan as commander of US forces in Afghanistan for the last 11 months.
American military doctrine had adapted too slowly to the changing tactics employed by Taliban militants. Overreliance on bomb-laden aircraft, attack helicopters, and guided missiles has not resulted in the defeat of the Taliban movement, but in many cases provided a useful recruitment tool given the rise in civilian casualties.
General Petraeus, who devised the strategy of strategic engagement and alliance building in Iraq, and newly installed General McChrystal, are likely to alter the strategy in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s special operations experience will likely emphasize and focus on economy of force, simplicity, adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance.
Outlook
In Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal and Gen. Petraeus are facing some of the same challenges the US faced in Iraq. Some of the same measures that proved effective in Iraq are likely to be applied in Afghanistan. We are likely to see enhanced focus on providing security for the Afghan people, training Afghan security forces, and potentially the creation of a Sunni-style awakening among the Afghan Pashtuns.
Some of the same policies may not prove effective due to the notable differences between the two environments. Unlike Iraq, the war in Afghanistan is primarily fought in the countryside, and the population is more ethnically and linguistically divided with a far less united political leadership. As such, we do not foresee a near-term solution to stabilizing Afghanistan and combating a resurging Taliban.
Achieving stated goals in Afghanistan is unlikely in 2009, as violence is likely to escalate to the highest levels seen in years. Gen. Petraeus and other military leaders are warning against high expectations, and Gen. McChrystal’s appointment reflects a much-needed change in a war that is growing increasingly deadly.
