Highlights
– Russia’s end to the counterterrorism mission in Chechnya is a symbolic move
– Ramzon Kadyrov has stabilized Chechnya through dictatorial actions
– Kadyrov likely to remain loyal to Moscow in the near to medium-term
Russia announced the end of counterterrorism operations in Chechnya on April 16, 2009. The result will be the eventual withdrawal of nearly 20,000 federal troops and the realignment of those remaining in the region.
Russia’s decision to withdraw troops from Chechnya underscores the success of the province’s leader, Ramzon Kadyrov, in establishing some level of security and weakening the resistance. Moscow’s decision to relinquish control and decrease its presence in Chechnya will further empower Kadyrov. The move is indicative of Moscow’s support and long-term commitment to Kadyrov as Chechnya’s leader. We believe as long as Kadyrov remains loyal to the Kremlin, he will be allowed to govern the province and continue to rule with limited oversight from Russia.
Stabilizing Chechnya
Moscow’s announcement to withdraw security forces from Chechnya is mostly symbolic, representing the official end of a conflict that erupted in 1994. In 1999, then-President Vladimir Putin sent federal troops into Chechnya with the primary objectives of putting down the separatist movement and destroying an insurgent movement it had accused of orchestrating bombings throughout Russia.
By 2007, Chechnya had stabilized largely under the rule and guidance of President Ramzon Kadyrov. Doku Umarov’s Chechen rebels, once a powerful and destabilizing force in the territory, were pushed deep into the mountains and into neighboring regions.
Under Kadyrov, the insurgency has been seriously weakened, budget revenues have increased, and reconstruction continues apace. However, all the strides made in Chechnya came with a price. Massive human rights abuses conducted by Kadyrov’s private militias and extrajudicial shootings throughout the region have been a relatively common affair during Kadyrov’s rule.
We note that despite being largely confined to the mountains, the insurgency, though less problematic, remains a threat to regional stability. Rebels continue to engage Chechen security forces in both rural and urban areas. Most attacks, however, have been small-scale, as the Chechen insurgents have been unable to carry out any major attacks for the past five years.
Kadyrov’s policies have shifted most violence to the neighboring regions of Dagestan and Ingushetia. In the near to medium term, we expect insurgent violence to be confined to these two regions due to weak local governments and widespread poverty.
Kadyrov’s Chechnya
Moscow appeared to achieve its objectives in Chechnya since authorizing its second invasion in 1999. The Chechen insurgency has been severely weakened and a separatist government desiring independence, is gone. In achieving its aims, Russia has invested significant resources and trust in local strongman Ramzon Kadyrov.
As long as Kadyrov remains loyal to Moscow, we expect relations between the two to remain mutually beneficial. However, if the Chechen leader adopts a more separatist tone and begins to challenge Moscow’s authority, the Kremlin will be in a similar situation it was in the 1990’s; facing a seperatist enclave within its southern border. Kadyrov may be inclined to further distance Chechnya from Moscow if he feels his personal control over the territory threatened in any way. The Russian government has given him considerable autonomy in running the affairs in Chechnya, and is giving him even more by announcing a troop withdrawal. He has been so bold as to use his authority to assassinate a political rival in the UAE; taking the first steps toward an independent foreign security policy.
Outlook
We do not anticipate Ramzon Kadyrov to challenge Moscow’s control or authority in the near to medium-term, primarily because he has too much to lose. Kadyrov enjoys the support of the Kremlin and has positioned himself as a very powerful leader within Chechnya. Challenging Moscow would result in a loss of political and financial support, as well as his likely death.
Moscow’s support for a strongman like Kadyrov is a harbinger of future Russian policy in unstable regions. Russia recently replaced Ingushetia’s President with a pro-Moscow leader. The Chechen model was a test case, dependent brutal enforcement of authority by Kadyrov. Now the test of the restraint of his authority will determine if Moscow will maintain control over its regions after all.
