Highlights
– Capabilities of the Pakistani Taliban likely to grow in the near-term
– Organization’s primary focus expected to remain on Pakistani targets
– TTP unity expected to remain until after the annual Afghan Taliban spring offensive
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistani-based umbrella organization consisting of several pro-Taliban groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The creation of the TTP is a recent phenomenon. The organization came into being on December 12, 2007 after a council of 40 senior Taliban leaders commanding an army of around 50,000 gathered and decided to unite under a single banner.
Since its creation, the TTP has increased its attack and organization capability as well as its strength. The group is blamed for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007 and countless other suicide bombings and guerrilla-style attacks throughout Pakistan. Among the group’s stated goals are resistance against the Pakistani Army, enforcement of Sharia Law, and unification against NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The government has failed in countering the threat posed by the TTP. Conducting half-hearted military offensives and signing peace agreements has done little to degrade the organization’s operational capabilities. Due to TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud’s success in unifying the organization, we believe the capabilities of the TTP are likely to grow further in the near to medium-term. While the majority of the TTP’s attacks will be guerrilla-style operations in FATA, the organization will continue employing suicide operations against government and civilian centers throughout Punjab and Sindh provinces in Pakistan.
Establishing Unity
The groups operating under the TTP act with considerable independence and vary in operational capability. The most significant threat exists in South Waziristan by the forces under the command of Baitullah Mehsud. Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a major militant network under the TTP umbrella and commanded by Maulana Fazlullah, poses a major security threat in Swat Valley. Other local networks under the TTP include Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur commanding forces in North Waziristan and Maulana Faqir Muhammad in the Bajaur Agency.
In December 2007, the consolidation of disparate “local Taliban” movements was a logical step in the Taliban’s insurgency campaign in northwest Pakistan. A unified Pakistani Taliban movement has allowed the groups to better coordinate both military and political operations inside Pakistan, as well as with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda.
Leadership rivalries and failure to agree on top priorities has resulted in numerous disagreements and inter-organizational violence. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had to intervene to end conflict within the TTP, successfully facilitating reconciliation between Mehsud and other rival leaders. Given the deep rivalries and lack of trust among several top Pakistani Taliban leaders, the likelihood of additional medium to long-term inter-organizational fighting is high.
The TTP can agree on several overarching goals, as well as a deep sense of loyalty to Mullah Omar, but priorities, choice of targets, and immediate goals will remain a major point of contention plaguing the organization for the long-term. Disagreement within the TTP is likely to lead to violence, but unlikely to resume until after the annual Afghan Taliban spring offensive in Afghanistan.
Future Outlook
The March 3, 2009 overture by Mullah Omar is an indication that with the deployment of additional United States (US) forces to Afghanistan, the Taliban feel the need to strengthen their forces. The overture was an attempt to convince TTP head Baitullah Mehsud and other commanders to shift their focus from conducting operations inside of Pakistan to focusing more on Afghanistan. While Pakistani Taliban leaders will remain loyal to Mullah Omar, the focus of TTP militant commanders will be targets located within Pakistan.
The lack of central government authority and weak rule of law in FATA and several areas in NWFP will continue providing the TTP a rich environment within which to operate, grow and conduct attacks.
We do not anticipate the Pakistani government to make significant headway against the TTP in the medium to long-term. We believe Mehsud and other commanders will maintain their strategic advantage over Pakistani security forces in FATA and several districts in NWFP. For Pakistan, this will pose as a major national security risk, jeopardizing the stability of the state. This is especially true as several of the militant networks that make up the TTP have solidified their rule in several of the Agencies and Districts in Pakistan, primarily South Waziristan, and now Swat Valley.
