Highlights
− Israel and HAMAS deem collateral damage an acceptable cost to achieve their political and military goals
− Likud government will not withdraw from Gaza without the establishment of international security controls
− HAMAS will win a significant representation in March 2009 PNA elections
On the ninth day of the Israeli air-offensive in the Gaza Strip, January 4, 2009, Israel launched a full-scale ground offensive. Within 24 hours, the Israeli military divided the Gaza Strip into five sectors and partially surrounded HAMAS’ primary seat of power, Gaza City. Four brigades of Israeli troops were deployed into the northern sector where HAMAS leaders and arms caches are most prevalent. At the close of the tenth day of combat, January 5, 2009, one Israeli soldier was killed and 30 wounded. During the same period of time, 517 Palestinian were killed and thousands wounded. Regardless of the high Palestinian body count, HAMAS leaders vowed to continue to launch Qassam rockets into Israel, firing 30 rockets into southern Israel on the same day.
Israeli officials contend their military campaign in the Gaza Strip is justified and will not end until it has destroyed HAMAS’ capability to fire rockets at Israeli targets. As such, Israel will likely ignore increased pressure from the international community to reach a ceasefire agreement with HAMAS in the near-term. Rather, both sides will accept collateral damage as a reasonable price to achieve their military and political objectives.
Political and Military Drivers
Despite their ideological differences, both sides of the conflict are motivated by a desire to win popular support before upcoming parliamentary elections and a failure of the most recent ceasefire to produce concrete change. In the view of HAMAS leadership, the 2005 ceasefire with Israel and the 2006 decision to wage a political offensive against Israel has been largely ineffective.
Despite its initial attempts to form a legitimate, effective government the international community refused to accept a democratically elected, HAMAS-led government in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Following its failure to receive international endorsement as a legitimate governing body, Fatah, Israeli, the US American and the European Union, strove to undermine HAMAS’ governance of the Palestinian Territories. Dealing a final blow to HAMAS’ leadership, a June 2007 battle between HAMAS and Fatah militias ended in divided governance of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Once again, HAMAS attempted to assert its rule and establish a legitimate government but its efforts were undermined by an Israeli and Egyptian enforced embargo of the territory. Due to widespread suffering resulting from the embargo, HAMAS leadership was incapable of reigning in rogue, extremist groups operating in the territory and, subsequently, of enforcing its June 2008 ceasefire agreement with Israel. Faced with a proposed Palestinian reconciliation agreement that left it powerless in a future Palestinian administration, HAMAS opted to accept war and high casualty levels in order to enhance its popularity ahead of March 2009 PNA elections and gain a stronger position at the negotiating table.
Likewise, the Israeli government found itself in an untenable position ahead of its December 2008 offensive in the Gaza Strip. Following HAMAS’ 2006 electoral victory, the Palestinian Territories were ruled by radical Islamists who had fought 15 years to bring about Israel’s destruction. Initially Israel sought to employ strong-arm diplomacy to compel HAMAS to recognize Israel’s right to exist. After diplomatic efforts failed, Israel sought to undermine HAMAS’ authority by funding and supporting its primary adversary, Fatah. It was these efforts and a major miscalculation by Israeli and Fatah leaders that led to the June 2007 HAMAS takeover of Gaza.
Still unwilling to accept HAMAS as a legitimate, trustworthy negotiating partner, the Israeli government accepted divided governance of the Occupied Territories in order to reach an agreement with the PNA. HAMAS, it determined, would be choked into submission by a yearlong embargo of the territory. Israel appeared at least partially correct in its assumption when HAMAS agreed to a bi-lateral ceasefire in June 2008. However, Israeli authorities were cognizant the ceasefire was a short-term solution and began preparation for a future offensive in Gaza. When HAMAS walked away from national reconciliation negotiations, permitted daily rocket attacks against Israel from the territory and allowed the ceasefire agreement to expire in the midst of Israeli parliamentary campaigns for the February 10, 2009 elections, the Kadima-led government prepared for war. In this instance, Israel’s decision was motivated by political and security drivers. Faced with a Likud lead in election polls, Kadima leadership needed to build its counterterrorism credentials. As a result, neither the Israeli government nor its citizenry will accept a Hizballah-like scenario in which Israeli troops withdraw from the Gaza Strip before devastating HAMAS’ military capabilities.
Outlook: the Gaza Strip
While HAMAS deems mere survival a victory, the Israeli government cannot leave the Gaza Strip without proving itself capable of winning a definitive victory. As such, Israel will not heed international calls for a unilateral Israeli ceasefire. Israel will nonetheless, likely declare victory before its campaign is complete, leaving security patrols to complete the military sweep of the territory. With the projected institution of a Likud government in Israel, Israeli troops will not withdraw from the territory until the PNA has regained sovereignty over Gaza and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Arab, or United Nations (UN) security force is in place to ensure HAMAS does not regain control.
HAMAS’ military capabilities will be severely handicapped by the Israeli offensive. Its political wing, on the other hand, will likely find new life in the aftermath of the Israeli offensive. As a result, HAMAS will likely win a significant representation in the PNA in March 2009 elections.
