Russian Influence Continues to Grow
In the largest naval deployment to the Caribbean since the Cold War, Russian vessels participated in joint naval exercises with Venezuela, and made ports of call to Panama, Nicaragua and Cuba in late November and early December 2008. Primarily a symbolic demonstration of growing power in the region rather than a military threat, Russia nonetheless exhibited its ongoing interest in Central and South America. Following its conflict with Georgia during August 2008, Russian foreign affairs have focused primarily on strengthening relations with likeminded socialist nations, as well as countries with pronounced anti-American policies.
Russian leadership has mainly concentrated its efforts into building relationships through military arms sales and training, as well as development opportunities in the financial and energy sectors.
•Venezuela has purchased over US$4 billion of military equipment from Russia since 2006, and additional sales of helicopters, arms and possible submarines are expected to continue throughout 2009.
•Nicaragua announced plans to send 14 officers to Russia for military training as helicopter and airplane pilots and tank commanders.
•Russia also hopes to establish a US$4 billion joint bank with Venezuela in the mid-term to offset difficult and expensive access to more traditional credit lines.
President Chavez has indicated his interest, and has offered to tap foreign currency funds if necessary to bank-roll the start-up.
Russian oil giant Gazprom has also become involved in oil projects in the region, such as obtaining a one-year grant to conduct geological studies in the southern Tarija province of Bolivia. Gazprom and Bolivia’s state-owned oil company YPFB intend to establish a joint venture in the coming year to explore production options, and while YPFB will retain a majority stake, the contract for Gazprom is estimated at US$2 billion.
Russia’s multi-dimensional involvement within Latin America is likely intended to both economically advance the country, as well as establish the former Soviet Republic as a strategic counter-force to United States (US) dominance in the Western Hemisphere. While Russia’s foreign policy goals in Latin America involved substantial financial commitments to projects such as infrastructure investment, for example a project with Venezuela for as trans-South America gas pipeline, the instability of oil prices, Russia’s primarily profit generating domestic industry, will likely limit the funds available for development projects abroad in 2009. In light of the current financial crisis and unstable global prices, Russia will likely remain involved in projects it has already committed to for 2009, however will not seek out large-scale additional projects.
United States Regional Policy to Remain Largely Status Quo
While Russia’s foreign policy will continue to expand its presence in Latin America in 2009, US policy towards the region will likely remain relatively unchanged in 2009 despite the upcoming change in presidential leadership in January 2009. With the election of Democrat Barack Obama and a Democratic majority Congress, many have urged President-elect Obama to revisit the Republican administration’s Latin America agenda. However, the appointment of Hilary Clinton to Secretary of State, with a history of more hard-line law and order policies despite her Democratic political affiliation, indicates that President-elect Obama may not choose to alter current Latin American policies as much as once believed. Assuming Clinton is confirmed as Secretary of State, her ongoing support for Colombia, as well as dedication to Israel, will likely lead her to remain tough on terrorism in the region, as well as mindful of the growing Iranian presence among leftist Latin American nations (Previous Report).
However, one area President-elect Obama will likely look to indicate a changing of Latin American policies is in regards to Cuba. While on the campaign trail in May 2008, President-elect Obama promised to a group of Cuban-Americans that upon taking office, he would immediately allow for unlimited family travel to Cuba, as well as lessen regulations on remittances. While younger constituencies of Cuban-Americas are pressing for broader reform to the US’ decades old Cuban embargo, President-elect Obama will likely not look for widespread change during his first year in office. He will likely grant the family travel and remittances reforms, allowing for a show of support for Cuban policy change without taking part in widespread reform.
In the long-term, President-elect Obama has indicated his interest in opening new diplomatic channels with nations such as Venezuela and Bolivia that currently maintain cooler relations with the US; however, the ongoing issues of the US’ economic crisis, as well as conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, will remain at the forefront for President-elect Obama, taking precedent over any substantial change to the nation’s Latin American policies in 2009.
Mexico’s Security Situation Closer to Stabilization By End of 2009
While President-elect Obama is unlikely to change the US’ foreign policy agenda in Latin America in his first term, the security situation south of America’s border will likely remain an immediate and ongoing concern. Throughout 2008, violence by feuding drug cartels, as well as an increased targeting of security personnel, has spread throughout Mexico, with the government recently reporting over 5,000 deaths since the start of the year due to drug-related violence. While the border cities such as Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana retain the largest concentration of violent attacks, the capital of Mexico City and resort areas such as Acapulco have also experienced targeted police assassinations.
•Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s initial strategy in 2006 in response to an increasing number of violent cartel murders was the deployment of over 20,000 troops throughout the country, however violence has only increased and military troops and federal police have become regular targets.
Additionally, rampant corruption at all levels of the Mexican law enforcement system has dampened the success of legitimate police operations.
However, in the waning months of 2008, President Calderon and the Mexican Congress have begun to target some of the root issues behind the ongoing violence. The Mexican Congress recently passed legislation to increase police powers, including the establishment of better undercover procedures and a witness protection program. Targeted internal investigations, specially government backed “Operation Clean House,” have resulted in the arrest of more than a dozen high-ranking police and prosecution officials for allegedly passing information to the cartels. Also, the first portion of a US$450 million US aid package to Mexico, the Merida Initiative, was released in early-December 2008, allowing resources for additional training programs and equipment.
Lack of funding and technical equipment will likely continue to be a challenge for security forces in 2009, however by the end of the year, there will likely be a moderate improvement in the police forces rapid-response capabilities. President Calderon and his administration will continue to focus on anti-corruption campaigns throughout 2009 in attempts to counter the cartels’ influence and violence, and look to secure additional releases of the Merida aid throughout the year. The US assistance will likely help to establish the foundations of a more credible police force by the end of 2009, however it is unlikely to reduce or favorably affect the rate of violence in 2009.
