Highlights
− Hariri, Nasarallah support stability ahead of May 2009 elections
− March 14 anticipates electoral win
− Hizballah leery of waning regional support
− March 14 win will not end in Hizballah disarmament
On October 26, 2008, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and Hizballah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasarallah met to discuss their differences ahead of November 5, 2008 national reconciliation meetings. The two party leaders confirmed their mutual respect for the Taif and Doha Accords, as well as the maintenance of political stability ahead of the May 2009 parliamentary elections.
With the proven willingness of the March 14 coalition to compromise in favor of peace, the road to the elections will be stable. The future stability of the Lebanese state, however, will hinge on the outcome of the May elections. The March 14 coalition is counting on a significant electoral win in the upcoming election.
However, regardless of the outcome of May 2009 Lebanon elections, the election results will be contested and some violence in likely to occur following the election results.
Hizballah’s Display of Force
Hizballah’s decision to apply force in defense of its illegal use of surveillance equipment at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport in May 7, 2008 resulted in 81 civilian deaths and significantly damaged its public image (Previous Report). The March 14 Coalition is wagering that Hizballah’s aggressive use of force against March 14 coalition members and Sunni militias will result in electoral gains. Following his meeting with Nasarallah, Saad Hariri told reporters, “What happened on May 7 was a lesson from which the opposition realized that nothing changes. May 7 signaled (a) collapse of Lebanon’s principals, dialogue… and the right to be different. Repercussions of that day persist and will persist in the future.” As such, he further elaborated that the May 2009 election will “reflect the people’s response to what has happened.”
As a result of this belief, the March 14 coalition proved willing to concede to immediate March 8 demands in order to maintain stability ahead of the May 2009 contest. In turn, March 14 has acquiesced to giving the March 8 coalition veto power in the cabinet and smaller voting districts. If the March 14 coalition defeats the March 8 coalition in May 2009, its concessions will cease in light of a perceived electoral mandate.
Regional Factors
Whereas Hizballah in the past acted with little regard for domestic political opposition, Hizballah is increasingly inclined to negotiate with Lebanese leaders. Its change of heart is not a result of its increased respect for the Lebanese military or March 14’s international patrons, but rather a reflection of potential shifts in regional allegiances. US relations with both Syria and Iran have thawed markedly in 2008, making the possibility of a peace agreement at Hizballah’s expense an increased likelihood. With Syria engaged in peace talks with Israel, Hizballah’s secure smuggling routes through Syria could be threatened, and with oil prices in decline Syria is increasingly likely to break with its Iranian benefactor in favor of wealthier patrons.
As a result, Hizballah is concentrating efforts on rebuilding its public image and reinforcing its power in Lebanese domestic politics. If Hizballah secures a sizable victory in upcoming elections, the group is likely to maintain its firm military grip on the country for the near-term.
However, if Hizballah looses to the March 14 coalition by a considerable margin, it will indefinitely face calls to disarm. If its right to maintain arms is challenged, Hizballah will be confronted with the options of using military force to preserve its arms—while risking international intervention and civil war—disarming and accepting a solely political role, or picking a fight with Israel to reinforce its claim that Lebanon requires its defense.
Outlook
Given that Hizballah will likely never voluntarily disarm, a March 14 win will inevitably lead to a military confrontation with Hizballah. The March 14 coalition will not seek to immediately challenge Hizballah’s arms, but will allow the group to resign itself to disarmament talks.
Valuing public opinion and recognizing the damage its May 2008 actions had on its public image, Hizballah will not directly challenge the Lebanese government concerning its right to arms. Rather, it will likely launch an attack against Israel.
