Highlights
– Radiation detection portals will now be tested at larger volume ports
– SFI created to complement existing container security programs
– Overall scope of SFI may strain port resources and hinder the flow of global commerce in the long-term
The United States (US) has completed three successful trials in the first phase of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted the trials at the Port of Southampton in the United Kingdom, Port Qasim in Karachi, Pakistan, and the Port of Puerto Cortes in Honduras. These ports were selected to test the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of US-bound cargo for radiation by utilizing new integrated radiation detection systems. Although the trials were successful, the ports handle relatively low volumes of cargo heading to the US.
Phase I of SFI will now be extended to four more ports that handle a large volume of cargo, as well as a large number of processed trans-shipments. The selected ports include the Modern Terminal at the Port of Hong Kong, Port of Salalah in Oman, the Brani Terminal at Port of Singapore, and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in South Korea. Testing the radiation detection equipment will be conducted on a limited basis, to be utilized at designated terminals within a port, or scanning a specific portion of US-bound containers.
With more than 11 million containers entering the US each year, the SFI could represent an important security upgrade to prevent radiological materials and weapons from entering the country. However, the initiative’s extensive overall scope may be impractical and could hinder the flow of global commerce in the long-term.
100 Percent Scanning
Under the SFI regime, cargo containers are passed through radiation portal monitors to scan for radioactive substances. Real time data is streamed to host government customs officials, CBP officers working at the ports, as well as CBP’s National Targeting Center. If an alarm is triggered indicating the presence of radiation, the data is combined with additional pieces of cargo information to determine risk levels. However if an alarm is not resolved by review of an X-ray image and the container is still considered a high risk after physical inspection, the container would likely be pulled from loading onto the ship.
A Joint Effort
The SFI complements several existing maritime security initiatives pertaining to cargo container safety:
• Container Security Initiative (CSI): The CSI established a risk assessment regime designed to single out potentially high-risk containers based on advance manifest information. The regime is currently operated in 58 overseas ports that represent more than 80 percent of US-bound cargo.
• Megaports Initiative: US officials train foreign port personnel and help determine the most effective placement for radiation equipment.
• Customs and Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT): Requires firms to align security regimes with suppliers’ to ensure access to containers on the supply chain is limited to authorized personnel.
• 24-hour manifest rule: Requires a container profile to be sent to US Customs 24 hours prior to loading onto a ship for pre-screening.
• “10 +2”: Requires 10 pieces of extra data from ocean carriers, customers and importers. Also requires the cargo’s physical location on a US- bound vessel and how full or empty a container is upon arrival.
Work in Progress
In theory, the SFI aims to complement the layered security approach already in place. However, several uncertainties remain regarding resources. To this end, the initiative would likely require a significant increase in trained port personnel to conduct manual examinations if an alarm is triggered. Additionally, the US has set a goal to implement the SFI at over 700 international ports by 2012, an outcome that may be not be a viable as the detection equipment still requires testing at the four large volume ports.
If the trials uncover potential technical difficulties, foreign governments may also become more resistant to the program. It may prove more efficient in the long-term to work on a more balanced risk assessment approach along the lines of the “10+2” program, while still utilizing the new high tech portal detectors for higher risk shipments. Still, failing to perfect the technology and inspection methods in the development stages could inadvertently lead to shipping delays that may harm the US economy in the long-term.
