Highlights
– Fatah al-Islam began as a splinter group from the Fatah al-Intifada in November 2006 under the leadership of Shaker al-Abssi
– Fatah al-Islam’s original mission to target Israel and US military assets and personnel operating in Arab lands was later modified to include Lebanese targets with the introduction of returning Iraq fighters and Saudi radicals
– The Battle of Nahr al-Bared effectively dismantled Fatah al-Islam, but surviving members have likely taken refuge with al-Qaeda in Lebanon cells
Fatah al-Islam is a Salafi jihadist group that was established in November 2006 after its leader Shakir al-Abssi and his followers split from the Syrian group, Fatah al-Intifada. Al-Abssi reportedly left Fatah al-Intifada after its leaders handed over two of his men to Lebanese military intelligence. The group originally emerged in the Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps Shatila and Ein al-Hilweh. The group’s ranks expanded rapidly, increasing the opposition of long-established Palestinian groups to Fatah al-Islam’s presence. Fatah al-Islam, therefore, relocated north to the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, where al-Abssi and his estimated 400-500 fighters claimed a large compound as their headquarters and their intent to bring religion to the Palestinian cause.
In an interview, al-Abssi described Fatah al-Islam’s primary goals as: “the Islamization of the Palestinian cause, the destruction of Israel, and the removal of US military presence from Muslim lands.” In addition, the group is rumored to have sought the establishment of an Islamic state in Tripoli, Lebanon.
Founding and Evolution
The evolution of Fatah al-Islam is linked to that of its leader Shaker al-Abssi. Al-Abssi was born in the West Bank city of Jericho in 1955. Following Israel’s occupation of the land throughout the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Jericho became an Israeli territory. Al-Abssi’s family soon fled to Jordan, where they resided in a Palestinian refugee camp outside of Amman. Later in life, al-Abssi joined Yassir Arafat’s Fatah organization. In the 1970s, al-Abssi was sent to Libya where he studied to become a fighter pilot in the Libyan military. As a member of the Libyan Air Force, al-Abssi fought against Chad in the 1980s and trained pilots in Nicaragua and the former North Yemen.
Upon returning to the Middle East, al-Abssi settled in Damascus, Syria. It was during this period of his life that al-Abssi befriended Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In 2002, Al-Abssi and al-Zarqawi were sentenced in absentia for their roles in planning the 2002 assassination of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) diplomat, Laurence Foley, and al-Abssi was arrested in Syria for his association with an illegal splinter faction of Palestinian Fatah, Fatah al-Intifada. Al-Abssi was released from Syrian prison in 2005 and fled to Lebanon, where he joined with fellow members of Fatah al-Intifada in a Palestinian refugee camp, Shatila.
In November 2006, Fatah al-Intifada’s senior leadership surrendered two of al-Abssi’s men to the Lebanese military intelligence. Soon after, Al-Abssi left the group in protest and formed Fatah al-Islam. Loosely aligned with al-Qaeda through the groups’ shared Salafi ideology, the group quickly won the loyalty of militants returning from fighting in Iraq. Some of the returning fighters joined the leadership and actively sought to increase the group’s ranks. As a result, the group’s membership expanded rapidly, with many members recruited from among the young, impoverished members of the Syrian and Palestinian communities. When it had outgrown its welcome in Shatila, the group relocated to Nahr al-Bared, northern Lebanon.
By the time Fatah al-Islam relocated to Nahr al-Bared, it had transformed from a hierarchical organization into a loosely governed organization of semi-autonomous cells. The new organizational structure combined with the introduction of former Jund as Sham leader Abu Hureira, and his loyal Lebanese fighters, and Saudi Sheikh Abu al Hareth, a close associate of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, radicalized the group and led to the expansion of its mission.
Initially, Fatah al-Islam faced less resistance in Nahr al-Bared. However, more radical Fatah al-Islam cells, such as the Qalamoun cell led by Abu Hureira’s close associates Naim Ghali (Abu Riyadh) and Walid Bustani, embarked on a campaign to forcibly impose their conservative practices on the camp’s relatively secular residents. Discontent within the populace soon grew resulting in some residents to rebel against Fatah al-Islam’s presence in Nahr al-Bared.
Some members of Fatah al-Islam’s traditional leadership also disagreed with the shifting mission of the group. These members, such as al-Abssi’s son-in-law Abu Laith, warned Abssi that the group risked losing their safe haven in Nahr al-Bared by alienating the people and reminded him that the group’s goal was to target Israel not the Lebanon. Before dying from wounds suffered during the battle at Nahr al-Bared, Abu Midyan confessed to a sheikh that “[his group] came at the wrong time, and that [their] real battle was with Israel, but the July War of 2006 prevented that, which forced [them] to meet in Nahr al-Bared and agree on different objectives.”
Nahr al-Bared
Fatah al-Islam cells had carried out operations inside Lebanon prior to the Battle of Nahr al-Bared. The group was wanted by the Lebanese government in connection with the February 13, 2007 Ein Alaq bus bombings, but the Lebanese Army was not permitted to enter Nahr al-Bared to apprehend the suspects due to a 1969 UN agreement that transformed Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps into semi-autonomous zones. The Lebanese Army, therefore, fortified its guard around Nahr al-Bared’s perimeter and waited to catch the militants trying to cross into Lebanese territory.
Initial fighting between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) occurred on May 20, 2007 when Lebanese security forces raided a Fatah al-Islam safe house in pursuit of suspects in the Amioun bank robbery (Previous Report). Fatah al-Islam militants engaged the LAF and eventually gained control of four LAF outposts on Nahr al- Bared’s perimeter. When the smoke settled after a 105 day military siege of Nahr al-Bared, 42 civilians, 163 Lebanese soldiers, and 222 militants had died in combat and approximately 30,000 refugees were displaced. Fatah al-Islam fighters were categorically defeated. Those who were not killed in the fighting escaped to the Beddawi Camp or Tripoli.
Present State
Fatah al-Islam was dismantled in the course of the 2007 Battle of Nahr al-Bared. Most of its members were killed in the fighting. Many others who escaped to nearby refugee camps or Tripoli were later arrested in LAF raids. Without its safe haven in Nahr al-Bared, remaining members are hunted by LAF forces and rejected by mainstream Palestinian leaders.
Fatah al-Islam leader al-Abssi was believed to have died in the battle. However, DNA testing of the body thought to be al-Abssi later disproved the initial identification. Al-Abssi is now thought to have escaped Nahr al-Bared two days before the LAF finished its sweep of the camp. Currently, he remains at large, most likely living in Lebanon.
Group members are presumably taking refuge among Lebanon’s small population al-Qaeda-linked cells. These groups are wanted in connection with the assassination of Brigadier General Francois Hajj and a February 2006 attack against an army barrack in Beirut.
The LAF is aggressively pursuing Fatah al-Islam and al-Qaeda in Lebanon cells operating in its territorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, future attacks linked to these groups are anticipated. However, after the loss of its safe haven in Nahr al-Bared, it is doubtful either entity will again reach the operational stature attained by Fatah al-Islam in the run-up to the Battle of Nahr al-Bared.
