Highlights
• On January 7 and 8, 2008, UNIFIL II witnessed three challenges to its authority in southern Lebanon
• Political instability in Lebanon provides an environment in which armed non-state actors cannot only thrive, but are increasing capable of carrying out attacks in violation of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire (UN Resolution 1701)
• Though a UNIFIL II spokesman contends it remains committed to fulfilling its mandate in southern Lebanon, it is ever more apparent that the force lacks both the authority and capabilities to do so
In the midst of a sustained political stalemate in the Lebanese Parliament, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II (UNIFIL) is facing renewed challenges. The week of January 7, 2008, UNIFIL II witnessed two violations of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1701, the ceasefire agreement that negotiated the end to the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, and one attack against its members. While UNIFIL II leadership affirmed their continued commitment to fulfilling UNIFIL II’s mandate, the 13,000 man force may prove incapable of satisfying its directive (Previous Report).
The Challenge
On January 7, 2008, Israeli soldiers arrested a Lebanese shepherd for illegally crossing into Israeli territory; the shepherd was later released into UNIFIL custody the following day. The Siniora government protested the shepherd’s arrest, saying that the shepherd was apprehended in Lebanese territory in what it considered a blatant kidnapping of a Lebanese citizen. The following day, January 8, 2008, two 107-mm Katyusha rockets were fired overnight from Lebanon into the northern Israeli town of Shlomi causing little damage and no casualties. On the same day, two Irish UNIFIL peacekeepers were wounded in a roadside bomb attack while traveling on the road between the southern Lebanese cities of Rmaileh and Sidon, the third such attack since the institution of the force’s expanded mandate in August 2006.
In its effort to fulfill its mandate to monitor both Israel and Lebanon’s adherence to the ceasefire agreement, UNIFIL II is faced with challenges stemming from the sustained political stalemate between the Lebanese government and opposition parties, increasing violence and instability in the Palestinian Territories, intensified Israeli campaigns against Hamas in Gaza, and renewed calls by al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-linked groups operating in Lebanon to strike Israeli targets. Already struggling to police repeated Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace, arms smuggling along the Syrian border, and Hizballah rearmament, UNIFIL II is ill-equipped to police al-Qaeda’s growing influence in the fledgling democracy, while fending off attacks against its personnel. Additionally, the Lebanese government currently lacks the cohesion, authority, and capabilities necessary to disarm armed-combatants operating within its borders.
A Way Forward
Despite UNIFIL II’s enhanced capacity, the interim force possesses neither the authority nor means of a sovereign government. While a properly functioning Lebanese government could achieve great strides in tackling the myriad of challenges to Lebanese national security, UNIFIL II’s mandate is not sufficient to fill the growing power vacuum. In the midst of Lebanese political deadlock, Israel too is weary of sustained political instability to its north. Hizballah-led efforts to secure veto power in the Lebanese Parliament, while facilitating an environment of insecurity and unrest, are a red warning sign for Israeli military analysts leery of Hizballah rearmament and possibly renewed strikes against Israeli targets.
With regard to the interim force, as evidenced in a Previous Report, there is reason to believe that both Israel and Hizballah are testing the determination and capabilities of UNIFIL II in order to assess what impact the interim force could have on their future operations. Though the small scale attacks, continued smuggling operations, and enhanced Hizballah capabilities to strike Israel from north of the “Blue Line” have not provoked a unilateral withdrawal of UNIFIL soldiers, UNIFIL II has indeed shown that its mandated powers fall short of providing the force with the necessary capacity to prevent a future outbreak of violence.
Therefore, should Israel deem the Lebanese government incapable of policing its borders or Hizballah’s need to remind its constituency that Israel remains a threat to Lebanese sovereignty, UNIFIL II will simply once again find itself caught in the crossfire.
