Highlights
– Primary drivers impacting the Mideast in 2008 include the Mideast Peace Process, Iraqi reconstruction, political progress, and counterinsurgency, the influx of oil wealth, and diplomatic engagement of Iran
– Of these, the Mideast Peace Process and instability in Iraq will be the most destabilizing factors, while the influx of oil wealth in the Gulf, by contrast, will foster regional development and security
– Iranian nuclear policy will remain an international and regional concern, but diplomatic efforts to forestall Iranian nuclear development will fall short of military engagement
The primary drivers impacting regional security and political and economic stability in the Middle East in 2007 have been the Mideast Peace Process, Iraqi reconstruction, political progress, and counterinsurgency, the influx of oil wealth, and diplomatic engagement of Iran.
The threat posed to peaceful nations in 2007 by insurgents emerging from the Iraqi theater will have a decreased impact in 2008. For the most part, the referred to fighters returned to their native countries pre-2008 and their impact on domestic insurgent operations has been observed. In the Middle East, they returned to primarily authoritarian regimes that have proven largely capable of policing their movements. Lebanon, the exception to this rule, did suffer at the hands of insurgents returning from Iraq, but, as a result of a nationwide crackdown on terrorist groups, will see decreased insurgent activity in 2008. A few foreign volunteers who fought in Iraq will become part of the al-Qaeda led international Islamic extremist network, and will continue to pose a security threat to both regional governments and the West.
Mideast Peace Process
The reinstitution of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will generate increased regional instability in 2008 as domestic, regional, and international actors vie to ensure their interests are represented. The volatility accompanying this round of peace talks is enhanced by the strict end of 2008 deadline for agreement, accompanying US President Bush’s departure from office, the divided leadership of the Palestinian Territories, and the weakened status of its powerbrokers (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, and US President George Bush).
In the coming months, as the peace process stumbles forward, internal conflict between Hamas, Fatah, and Israel will escalate exponential, possibly into full-scale conflict. Opportunities to avert war with Hamas were sidestepped in recent months; including Hamas tendered proposals for opening talks with Fatah and negotiating a cease-fire with Israel. PA President Abbas hinted in November 2007 that an Israeli led offensive against Hamas in Gaza would be acceptable and Israeli military operations to date display its possible willingness to do so. However, at the same time, PA-Israeli talks concerning Jerusalem and the ‘right of return’ for refugees ignited protests throughout the Middle East, including Israel. Interest groups willing to ignite conflict concerning the division of Israel or the cancellation of refugee rights are active on both sides, and are already providing increased military to Hamas.
Should the peace process move forward, overtures from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad of interest in opening Israeli-Syrian track talks will be accompanied by threats of a 2008 Israeli-Hizballah conflict and Iranian efforts to buttress Hamas led strikes against Israeli targets, strikes against which Israeli intelligence and security services cannot completely defend.
Iraqi Reconstruction, Political Progress, and Counterinsurgency
Security gains made by the US military, the Iraqi Security Forces, and regional “Awakening Councils” against al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq in 2007 was considerable. However, the 50 percent decrease in violence since June 2007 is reversible should the Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr not extend his declared ceasefire against US military targets. Iraqi security forces prove incapable of maintaining their ground in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and the south, and/or if displaced insurgent groups are allowed to rebuild in Northern Iraq.
In the meantime, Iraq’s neighbors are anxious to expedite the repatriation of Iraqi refugees. Syria and Jordan have both instituted tight restrictions on Iraqi refugees housed within and those seeking admittance across their borders. These visa restrictions, as well as strained cash flow, are forcing many Iraqi refugees to return to Iraq. Upon arrival, many refugees find that their houses are either inhabitable or are occupied by internally displaced squatters. The contribution of these returning refugees to Iraqi domestic instability will increase in 2008 as the influx of returning refugees quickens.
The onus of responsibility to ensure both the security of Iraq and the settlement of property disputes will fall on the Iraqi government. 2008 will see a drawdown of coalition forces and pressure for US forces to both reduce their presence and restrict activities; as well as an accompanying rise in factional violence as each sect faces internal power struggles over who will fill the emerging post-US security vacuum. With its over taxed bureaucracy, ineffective parliament, and security forces wrought with sectarian allegiances, there is little hope the Iraqi government will prove capable of averting an increase in sectarian conflict and factional violence in 2008.
Influx of Oil Wealth
Record-breaking oil prices and the resulting influx of oil wealth into the Gulf afforded the comparatively stable Gulf regimes an increased level of authority and influence in the region. For their part, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are using their wealth collectively toward economic development and expanded security measures (Previous Report). The council’s official institution of a Customs Union in early 2008 and its efforts toward creating a Monetary Union in 2010 will lead to greater economic interdependence and stability among member states. Having solidified ties internally, GCC member states are seeking to promote peace in the region through economic development programs and constructing a joint nuclear energy program.
The GCC is also for the first time engaging in limited diplomatic relations with Iran. Gestures like the extension of an invitation to attend the GCC annual summit and the Hajj to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are indicative that the GCC, as one of the region’s most powerful actors, beginning to assume its future role of a counterbalance to Iranian regional influence and a possible mechanism through which extremist Iranian foreign policy can be mitigated. Such gestures and economic and political cooperation between GCC member states and Iran are expected to increase and yield a greater impact on regional and economic security in the near and long-term.
Diplomatic Engagement of Iran
The international debate surrounding the best formula for engaging Iran will extend well into 2008, and has the potential to create increased regional instability. For its part, Iran has ended debate surrounding the nature of its nuclear program and is seeking increased sponsorship and increased foreign investment in 2008. Should Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prove incapable of convincing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that Iran’s nuclear program is in fact for peaceful purposes, additional sanctions and the potential threat of a military strike against Iranian nuclear infrastructure will regain influence in public debate. This, as well as Iran’s alleged role in destabilizing Iraq, will create a volatile regional foreign policy environment in the coming months as the end of 2008 deadline for Iranian nuclear energy production nears.
