Highlights
– Al-Furqan is the media production arm of al-Qaeda’s Iraqi franchise the Islamic State of Iraq
– Recent raids by US military forces had limited al-Furqan’s media production and dissemination capability
– Al-Furqan appears to be attempting a comeback by producing and distributing 4 new videos since November 24, 2007
On October 31, 2006, the formation of the “al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production,” was announced by the Islamic State of Iraq. The statement read, “the Ministry of Information in the Islamic State of Iraq is pleased to announce the formation of a media establishment that will handle audio and video dispatches, and all media issuances from the Ministry of Information in the Islamic State of Iraq, may Allah glorify and facilitate it.”
Capabilities
Al-Furqan is the official multi-media agent of the Islamic State of Iraq. It has released a number of speeches by the leader of the ISI, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muajir. Al-Furqan also produces original videos in the series “Knights of Martyrdom,” i.e. documentation of suicide operations, and “The hell of Romans and Apostates in the Land of the two Rivers,” consisting of short and medium length clips of military operations.
Due to its prolific ability to produce audio, video and written propaganda, and its documented relationship with a number of well-known jihadist websites al-Furqan has been able to effectively disseminate ISI propaganda to a broad and diverse audience. Al-Furqan is widely respected across the jihadist Internet and acts as a force multiplier for the ISI by boosting morale, aiding fundraising, and encouraging sympathizers to actively participate in Jihad.
Disruption
As a result, throughout the summer of 2007 US military forces in Iraq engaged in a sustained campaign to disrupt or eliminate altogether al-Furqan’s media production and dissemination capabilities.
According to US Navy Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith, Director of Communications Multi-National Corps Iraq, “since the surge began, we’ve uncovered eight separate al Qaeda media offices and cells, have captured or killed 24 al Qaeda propaganda cell members and have discovered 23 terabytes of information.” As a result of these raids, Admiral Smith believes that al-Furqan’s media production and distribution capability have been diminished by approximately 80 percent.
Reemergence
This campaign achieved tremendous results as demonstrated by al-Furqan’s failure to publish any videos throughout October 2007 and most of November 2007. Although, al-Furqan was unable to produce and distribute new videos during this time period, it is important to note that while its propaganda capabilities were diminished they were not entirely destroyed as the group was still able to release written statements documenting its progress in Iraq.
Over the last two weeks, it appears that the ISI’s media arm has reemerged. Since November 24, 2007, al-Furqan has released four new videos documenting attacks against US and Iraqi government forces.
The ability to produce and disseminate videos is of tremendous import to al-Furqan, the ISI and al-Qaeda as it demonstrates success to jihadist sympathizers in Iraq and worldwide. Al-Furqan’s ability to promote al-Qaeda’s jihad in Iraq directly affects internal morale, recruiting, fundraising and may indirectly affect to cohesion of the broader jihadist movement. As such, al-Furqan recognizes the tremendous value of these videos and has likely worked tirelessly to regenerate its previously demonstrated capabilities.
Outlook
The US military has rightly recognized the importance of propaganda to the ISI and other terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Iraq. It will therefore likely continue to target these groups with arrests and if necessary, further military action. However, al-Furqan has recently demonstrated its ability to regenerate its media production and distribution capability.
In the long-term, with continued pressure from US military forces in Iraq it is unlikely that al-Furqan would be able to regain the pace of its previous media operations. Continued pressure from the US military will force an unending cat and mouse game with al-Furqan and likely limit the group from a return to an unimpeded production capability. Unfortunately, al-Furqan may not need to regain its previous prolific production capability, and instead can demonstrate the ISI’s and al-Qaeda’s viability in Iraq with a scaled back media operation.