US-led efforts to defeat the foreign jihadist threat in Iraq will be strengthened by two recent developments: the Iraqi Cabinet agreement on oil policy and the increased willingness of Anbar based tribal leaders to fight Al Qaeda. The former aims to win over the Sunni community that provides support to the insurgency; the latter could ultimately rob foreign jihadists of their primary safe haven in western Iraq. Both developments seek to limit the appeal of al Qaeda, weaken its ties to the Sunni community, and ultimately isolate the group from broader Iraqi society.
An Equitable Oil Policy
With the oil fields lying in the Shiite controlled south and in the northern region of Kurdistan, the centrally based Sunnis fear exclusion from the vast wealth of Iraq’s abundant natural resources. Moreover, they are strong supporters of a centrally governed Iraq and against the push for complete regional autonomy by segments of the Kurdish and Shiite leadership.
In its current form, the national hydrocarbon draft law approved by the Iraqi Cabinet addresses Sunni concerns. The law calls for the centralized collection of oil and gas revenue and a subsequent equal distribution of those funds across Iraq based on population. Regional governments are allowed to negotiate energy contracts in their territory – including with foreign companies, but their authority is limited. A multi-sect Federal Oil and Gas Council is empowered to oversee and suspend contracts should they fail to meet pre-subscribed standards.
Though the Iraqi Parliament must still approve the national hydrocarbon draft law in what is likely to be a heated and extensive process, the law is expected to pass given that the leadership of the various sects was represented in the Cabinet compromise.
Tribal Opposition to al Qaeda
In the aftermath of the invasion, central government authority was dismantled across Iraq. The effect was particularly dramatic in the Sunni dominant Anbar province – which is entirely distrustful of the Shiite-led government in Baghdad – leading to a state of virtual lawlessness. Al Qaeda entrenched itself in the region, carving out an identity as defenders of the Sunni community against Shiite aggression.
While a majority of Anbar based tribes originally accepted the foreign jihadist presence, the tide has recently changed. Al Qaeda’s clear intent to ignite an Iraqi civil war, its encroachment upon the tribes’ oil smuggling operations, and its brutal assassinations of sheikhs opposed to its ideology have alienated a majority of Anbar’s tribes from the foreign jihadist contingent.
In September 2006, the Anbar Salvation Council (aka Anbar Awakening) was formed – a 25 tribe conglomerate pledged to combating al Qaeda’s influence in Anbar Province. The ASC boasts of 6,000 fighters, which includes a rapid reaction emergency brigade, and reportedly receives logistical support from the US and Iraqi national forces (source). Of critical importance, tribal leaders are also encouraging their members to join the Iraqi Army and Police. The police force in Anbar’s capitol city, Ramadi, has increased from 400 to 1,000 members over the last year (source). Predictably, as ASC efforts have gained traction in the province, Al Qaeda and its affiliated Iraqi network of tribes have fought back, and the recent escalation of Sunni-on-Sunni violence has spiked accordingly.
Conclusion
The multi-sect Cabinet’s agreement over the complex oil policy issue is a vital demonstration of compromise at a time when civil strife threatens to destroy Iraq. Passage of the law will inspire some level of Sunni confidence in the national project; potentially wearing away the vital base of recruitment and support for the insurgency, and its foreign jihadist contingent. Maintaining the allegiance of the ASC to the counter-terror effort likewise robs Al Qaeda of a critical support base, and also provides localized intelligence that US and outside Iraqi forces are incapable of obtaining without assistance.
