Cote d’Ivoire’s President Laurent Gbagbo’s administration and the New Forces rebels, led by Guillaume Soro, signed a peace deal on March 4, 2007 after more than a month of negotiations. The deal allegedly ends a four-year crisis that divided the nation, forced the displacement of 750,000 Ivorians, and crippled the national health and sanitation infrastructures. This time, Soro sounded committed to the accord, saying that “peace is strongly possible in Cote d’Ivoire.” Similarly, Gbagbo highlights his peace negotiations as an example that “all the problems in Africa can find a solution here on the continent.” The deal is plausible since both sides’ leaders participated and engaged each other directly. As long as it lasts, Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore can claim the accord as his success. However, all is not copasetic.
A signed document does little without implementation and genuine effort toward peace. Both sides agreed to a power-sharing government, which Soro is like to head as prime minister, a move that would force out Prime Minister Charles Banny. The peace accord allows not only for a monitoring presence that decreases every other month but also a transitional government, elections, and documentation of Ivorians. Gbagbo delayed elections in October 2005 and again in October 2006. Both sides agreed to an integrated operational structure for their joint armed forces with a command center to be operational by mid-March; however, disarmament is also a requirement on both sides before the election. Finally, they have agreed to amnesty laws (Previous Report), have called on the UN to lift sanctions (Previous Report), and have banned weapons imports for three months after the election (Previous Report).
Feeling Good but Little Hope
Ivorians largely seem hopeful that this peace agreement might hold and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon applauded the men’s efforts. France’s Foreign Ministry deputy spokesman Anges Romatet-Espagne suggested that “the international community’s presence in Cote d’Ivoire would likely change,” implying an influx of foreign expatriate. Both the UN and France maintain a sizable peacekeeper force, whose mandate expires on June 30, along the so-called “confidence zone” to buffer the rebel-held north and the government-held south.
While this signature is the country’s “best hope for lasting peace,” peace talks and hopefully breakthroughs in the past have not produced lasting peace.
• Leaders on both sides are known for disregarding accords they signed and announcing assassination or coup attempts (Previous Report) to discredit the opposing side.
• Historically, we identified 14 separate attempts at peace going back to 2003 (Previous Report and Previous Report).
Foreign organizations already present in Cote d’Ivoire—humanitarian and aid organizations and peacekeepers—are unlikely to withdraw in the near-term. Many will remain to ensure peace or, at least, prevent an escalation in tensions, especially since many have been in country since the September 2002 failed coup that sparked the current crisis. Further, now is a crucial time to remain, as the presidential elections, slated within 10 months (before January 2008), could be one of the most tense since the coup. Conversely, the international community not yet squarely in Cote d’Ivoire—multinational businesses—are unlikely to be confident in the peace and, thus, are unlikely to flood into the country to set up shop in the near- to mid-term. Until a legitimate vote can take place—an illustration of implementation of the peace conditions, the country’s possible devolution should give pause to those considering operations in country (Advisory).
