On February 15, 2007 the 110th Congress introduced legislation to “require the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve and expedite the assessment and determination of current and emerging chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material threats, [and] to group such agents to facilitate the assessment and acquisition of countermeasures that would address more than one of such agents or adverse health consequences common to exposure to different agents.” (H.R. 1089)
Project BioShield’s Problems
President George Bush first proposed Project BioShield during his 2003 State of the Union address. As one of several bio-defense programs, the project was formally signed into law on July 21, 2004. Despite its allotment of US$5.6 billion in funding and almost three years of existence, the program has produced few results.
Misguided Direction
One reason for the lack of productivity resides in the disadvantages inherent within defensive countermeasures. Typically, the pursuit of CBRN countermeasures requires a lengthy research-and-development timeframe. The lapse in time that occurs between the recognition of the threat agent and the development of its countermeasure leaves the defensive actor vulnerable to attack. It also affords the offensive actor a cushion within which he may alter or create a new the threat agent that enables the actor to bypass the countermeasures under development. Project BioShield’s pursuit of single-agent countermeasures exacerbates this disadvantage.
The Project BioShield Material Threats Act of 2007 attempts to address this problem by calling for the pursuit of countermeasures that address an entire category of threat-agents that are grouped together because of the symptoms they elicit rather than the materials they are composed of. The development of singular countermeasures capable of addressing an entire category of threat-agents might allow the defense to recapture a comparative advantage.
Insufficient Incentive
A lack of proper direction accounts for a fraction of the problem, though. In order to enlist the participation of the nation’s most capable corporations in the pursuit of symptom-specific countermeasures, an amendment that addresses the lack of incentives needs to be formulated. In its current form, Project BioShield can deliver payment to developers once the countermeasure is proven effective and manufactured for dissemination. While Project BioShield allows the government to award contracts to promising developers years in advance, the lack of guaranteed funding dampens corporate incentives to pursue R&D that holds virtually no value in the private market and yields minimal levels of profit if sold to government agencies.
While such a stringent tactic works remarkably well for ensuring that government dollars are spent on only successful countermeasures, scientific advancements are generally achieved neither in fast-pace nor with 100 percent success. Furthermore, when dealing with scientific advancements, even efforts that fall short of the desired end result tend to produce valuable insight that may be used as a stepping stone for future projects. However, because Project BioShield does not reward such less-than-complete advancements, companies fail to see the value in investing capital and manpower. As the recent governmental withdrawal of the US$877 million contract to VaxGen for the development of an anthrax vaccine illustrates, an allocation of funds is anything but guaranteed.
A Way Forward
One course of action that should not only help to alleviate the insufficient incentives problem but would continue to provide the government with a safeguard against the frivolous allocation of federal funds involves the installation of a tiered system of awards to participating companies when specified milestones are achieved. While failures will still occur and government funds may produce little actionable countermeasures, much can still be gained through such shortcomings. Future endeavors can build upon so-called failures. The lowered funding barrier would increase the incentives and encourage companies to become involved in the pursuit of CBRN countermeasures. As more companies become involved, the likelihood that effective countermeasures will be realized increases.
