On February 25, Somali pirates hijacked the UN-chartered freighter, MV Rozen, off the coast of northeastern Somalia . It was the first time pirates hijacked a boat off the coast of Somalia since Ethiopian troops helped the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) oust the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) from Mogadishu in 2006 (Previous Report). The Kenyan- owned MV Rozen was seized after delivering 1,800 tons of food aid to the towns of Bosasso and Berbera in the independent enclave of Puntland. With the SICC out of power and the increasingly negative sentiment for foreign peacekeepers in Somalia, the hijacking indicates a regrouping of a band of Somali pirates and reinforces the nation’s resistance to any foreign aid or assistance.
A Longtime Coming
The pirates, armed with AK-47s, stormed the freighter and its crew of six Kenyans and six Sri Lankans from a speedboat, likely mounted with machine guns. It was the third seizure of a ship carrying food aid by the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) in the past two years. The MV Rozen narrowly escaped an attempted hijack off the coast of Somalia in March 2006 after another UN humanitarian delivery (Previous Report). The Kenyan shipping company, Motaku, owns the MV Rozen, and it is the only shipping company that has agreed to take food aid to Somalia. If pirates continue to attack UN-chartered vessels, it would undermine the delivery of relief food to Somalia and further aggravate the desperate humanitarian situation there.
This hijacking came four days after a violent resistance group, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRMLTM), threatened to kill foreign peacekeepers entering Somalia (Previous Report). The group specifically targeted Ugandans and Kenyans in their message posted on a former SICC website.
Somali pirates historically worked independently as private cartels and usually did not mesh their interests with resistance groups or other anti-government/terrorist organizations. When the SICC was in power, piracy was strictly prohibited because it was against Islamic law. Additionally, pirates had stolen a weapons’ shipment belonging to the Islamists. In November 2006, Islamists loyal to the SICC rescued a commercial ship belonging to the United Arab Emirates that was hijacked by Somali pirates. However, Somali pirates have caught on and are taking advantage of increasing anti-foreign-”intrusion” sentiment. Although the pirates have not yet communicated their motives and/or ransom for the hijacking, they likely specifically targeted the MV Rozen because it is Kenyan-owned and UN-chartered.
Threat to Commercial Cruise Liners
Although there was an attack on a commercial cruise liner in Somalia in November 2005 , the likelihood of pirates attacking a commercial ship remains relatively low for several reasons. First, the focus in Somalia for the last few months has been on repelling foreign (Western and African) peacekeepers from stepping foot into Somalia. Pirates have been missing in action for last seven months because of the SICC’s stance on piracy and their comeback attack has conformed to the central focus in Somalia: to deter foreign services from involvement in country. Additionally, pirates are interesting in attacking ships to rob them of their materials; pirates are more interested in raising funds to purchase weapons and engage in other criminal acts. Attacking a major cruise liner in the near to long-term would only injure their goals and cripple their capabilities. Second, pirates lack sufficient capabilities to conduct an attack on cruise liners. The assault on the Seabourn Spirit was an amateur attack, at best. The likelihood of pirates conducting a large-scale attack on a cruise liner in the near-term is less than before, given their shortage of weapons since the government’s call to disarm in January and since the pirates have been inactive for such a long time.
Looking into the Future
The common interest shared by independent pirates and radical Islamists to target and attack foreign aid in Somalia may have the potential to develop into a wider violent campaign dedicated to stomping out the peacekeepers. Piracy is a well-established maritime terrorism tactic in Somalia. Humanitarian aid vessels have been attacked in the past, like the tsunami relief ship that was hijacked in June 2005 . Although there have been incidents suggesting that terrorism and piracy have merged, the likelihood for this nexus has never been as strong as in recent days (Previous Report). The recent increase of attacks on TFG and Ethiopian forces has provided a green light for other acts of terrorism to flourish in Somalia, including the revival of piracy in the war-torn country.
