Since the expiration of the Supreme Islamic Court Council?s (SICC; Group Profile) deadline for Ethiopian troops to withdraw from Somalia on December 19, 2006, fighting between the two sides has been consistent for almost two weeks. After one week of heavy fighting, the Ethiopia -backed Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) took over the SICC capital, Mogadishu, pushing the Islamic militia forces further south to the seaport city, Kismaayo. However, by January 1, 2007, TFG and Ethiopian troops successfully took over the seaport city, leaving no other stronghold for the SICC and pushed them even further south to the Kenya border. Kenyan troops have closed off their boarder to Somalia and have already arrested 10 foreign extremists.
The TFG?s relatively swift defeat of the SICC militias was unanticipated and has paved the way for a long and contentious campaign to rebuild a government in battle-scarred Mogadishu. Taking over the capital and pushing the Islamist fighters back is only half the battle for the interim government and its peacekeeping forces. The TFG will have to win the support of warring clans and sub-clans that have been without a central authority for 15 years. Additionally, the new authority will have to fight off remnants of SICC loyalists who could turn their campaign into an Iraqi-style insurgency, catapulting the nation into more intense political instability.
Why Did the SICC Fail and Retreat?
According to several ex-Islamist fighters in Mogadishu, the reason behind the SICC?s defeat is conflicting orders from the Court?s supreme officers, who first called for an attack then a retreat. Many put the blame on the Court?s top security officer, Yusef Mohammed Sayed, for mishandling the standoff, giving Ethiopian forces seven days to withdraw and then inviting Islamic jihadists to come fight in Somalia . Islamists were ready to stand up to Ethiopian troops, but they were told to retreat. Many felt betrayed after the Courts collapsed before paying fighters their $200 monthly salary.
The SICC?s leadership was corrupted by power and its successful, yet surprising, victory over US-backed warlords in June 2006. According to one former fighter, ?their ambition was high, but they had no plan.? The last few weeks began to split the Courts into two factions: one that wanted to pursue negotiations with the TFG and another that was pushing for an attack on Baidoa. The latter group overruled, only find their fighters routed by Somali government forces and 4,000+ Ethiopian troops. After being confronted with such a strong offensive force, it was only a matter of time before the SICC militias were southward-bound and heading underground.
A Long Road Lies Ahead for the New Somali Government
On January 1, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi announced the end of ?the warlord era in Somalia? and granted amnesty to SICC loyalists who turn over their weapons to the interim government. Hundreds have obliged and returned to their native clans; however, more have retreated to the Kenyan border, maintaining a low profile until further notice. TFG and Ethiopian forces are actively pursuing SICC leaders, including three al-Qaeda suspects, for their involvement in the simultaneous US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Country Profile, Terrorist Incident) in 1998. However, the number of Somali refugees already in Kenya will make it easier for SICC leaders and/or al-Qaeda suspects to blend into the population, making it increasingly more difficult for the TFG to route out the Islamists, and allowing leaders to form rebel splinter groups.
Feeling more confident of the government?s stronghold in Mogadishu after many ex-fighters laid down their weapons, Prime Minister Gedi called for the deployment of African Union peacekeeping forces to replace Ethiopians, who many Somalis still consider invaders. Gedi?s call for a replacement of Ethiopian forces is a positive step toward transitioning into maintaining peace in war-torn Mogadishu.
However, the longstanding request for US military assistance in Somalia that is on the table for serious discussion and consideration, according to Somali Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdikarin Farah, would throw a wrench into the peace process in Somalia. Welcoming US military forces into Mogadishu is likely to be reminiscent of the bloody Blackhawk Down incident in 1993 and will force Somalis to take sides, hindering the peace process. The majority of Somalis disapprove of Ethiopian forces in their territory, so they are hardly likely to be any more welcoming to the involvement of US military forces.
Furthermore, should the deployment of US forces or any other foreign force destabilize the nation, SICC loyalists may take advantage of the opportunity. They could reorganize themselves (albeit into smaller rebel groups) and conduct small to medium scale terrorist attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia, and against the new government in Somalia. These guerrilla warfare tactics would effectively destabilize the peace process and would postpone nation-building efforts, potentially leading to a downward spiral effect of the new government?s political power and stronghold.
