The dual announcements of an Iraqi draft law revising de-Baathification and Prime Minister Maliki?s intention to replace cabinet officials indicate some progress toward a political solution that may bring stability to Iraq . The draft law is less restrictive than its predecessor and seeks to re-integrate the majority of Baath Party members into Iraqi society and government. The cabinet shake-up will target incompetent ministers and those more loyal to personal sects than the national government.
The recent death sentence of Saddam Hussein by an Iraqi court played a significant role in the timing and formation of these initiatives. The amendments to the de-Baathification standard were in part intended to pacify the Sunni Iraqi community (a significant portion belonged to Saddam?s Baath Party) angered by the Hussein verdict and their perception of exclusion from the current Iraqi government. Conversely, the verdict enhanced the legitimacy of the national government among Shiites for exacting justice on the brutal oppressor of their community. Maliki is playing on that momentum, hoping to leverage an increase in popular Shiite support against the leaders of warring Shiite militias.
De-Baathification Draft Law
The Supreme National Commission for de-Baathification, created by the Coalition Provisional Authority in November 2003 to rid the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein loyalists, has drafted a law to be presented before Parliament that presents thousands of Iraqi Baathists with an opportunity to win back jobs or receive state pensions. The amended rules continue to ban 1,500 senior party members but will remove 10,000-30,000 Iraqis (estimates vary) from the ?black list? if they choose to excommunicate themselves from the Baath Party, currently an illegal organization under Iraqi law. Security agencies under Saddam Hussein?s direct control and the paramilitary Fedayeen are not included in the Commission?s purview and will have their cases handled directly by the Prime Minister?s office (source).
The original decision to dissolve the Baath party and ban its members from government employ helped spark the Iraq insurgency and deprived state ministries of thousands of educated and capable workers. Many Sunni Iraqis were in the Baath Party, as membership was required for such basic things as career advancement, university enrollment, and medical care (source). Thus, the draft law is a direct attempt to win Sunni support for the national government and keep their sympathies from domestic and foreign Sunni insurgent groups.
Iraqi Cabinet Shake-Up
Prime Minister Maliki is seeking to remove approximately tencabinet members in an effort to improve government competence and national?as opposed to sectarian–loyalty. Maliki had little involvement in the original formation of his cabinet,, as most members were chosen among political blocs prior to his selection as prime minister. In making changes, Maliki will not alter the delicately balanced distribution of cabinet seats among the various ethnic parties (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd), but will insist on capable candidates faithfully serving national interest.
Corruption and the failure to provide basic services has plagued the national government and led to its flagging support among the Iraqi populace. Furthermore, the infiltration of sectarian militia members in government ministries?predominately Shiite militia infiltration of the Interior Ministry and Iraqi Police Force–has fueled the sectarian violence engulfing Baghdad. Most cabinet members and parliamentarians are affiliated with political blocs (including Maliki?s Shiite United Iraqi Alliance ) that maintain militias, and some are beholden to sectarian agendas. In addressing this issue, Maliki used his strongest language in authorizing ?extreme force? against the militias and stated: ?There cannot be a government and militias together. One of the two should rule? (source).
Maneuvers In-Line with US Strategy
The decision to remake the Iraqi cabinet and reform the de-Baathification process?a vital component of Maliki?s 24-point National Reconciliation Plan released in June 2005–are indicators of increased power in the Prime Minister?s office. Moreover, they are positive steps toward isolating the insurgency and curbing militia power. And, despite recent reports of a rift between Maliki?s office and the Bush administration, these initiatives will directly support three pillars of America?s strategy for success in Iraq: 1) strengthening the national government; 2) involving Sunnis in the national political process; and 3) cracking down on sectarian militias to quell ethnic violence.
