In an anticipated policy speech before the Knesset, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert conspicuously failed to mention plans for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank, the centerpiece of a platform that won him and his Kadima party electoral victory less than eight months ago . The continued conflict emanating from Gaza and Lebanon ?two regions from which Israel unilaterally withdrew–spelled the political death knell of the convergence plan , leaving Kadima, Olmert, and the Israeli government adrift in terms of a clear policy direction.
Olmert expressed interest in pursuing talks with Lebanese President Fuad Siniora and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas; however, the former has no intention of reaching a peace agreement with Israel, and the latter would be unable to enforce one. The two critical players in the region remain Iran and Syria . If Olmert is to craft a new identity for Kadima and his coalition government, it is likely to revolve around Israel’s policy toward its enemies in Damascus and Tehran.
Will Not Tolerate a Nuclear Iran
From an Israeli perspective, Iran is particularly threatening in that it leads a cadre of militarily effective non-state actors (Hezbollah , Hamas , PIJ ) under a shared belief that Israel is an illegal entity that must cease to exist. In this regard, Iran’s nuclear program clearly compounds Israel’s concern. In response, the Israeli government has threatened Iran publicly and is working to cultivate a bloc of Arab allies who are likewise opposed to Tehran’s foreign policy.
While visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin, Olmert made clear that:
(1) Israel could never reconcile a nuclear Iran,
(2) has no room for error given the Iranian President’s polemic comments, and
(3) that “the Iranians need to fear that something that they do not want to happen to them, will happen to them” (source).
Israeli news sources have speculated Olmert’s statement indicated Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities in the event international sanctions fail to dissuade Iran from seeking a nuclear weapon.
The Israeli government also appears to be courting stable, relatively moderate Sunni Arab regimes that are wary of Iranian intentions in the Middle East. As Olmert noted in his policy speech, “I am pleased a moderate axis of countries in the Arab world has been created that wants to take part in blocking Iran’s influence in the region” (source). Indeed, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt initially rebuked Iran’s proxy?Hezbollah–for attacking Israel in July 2005 , and Olmert then reportedly met with a high ranking Saudi official in what would be an unprecedented conclave for the two nations . Olmert publicly praised King Abdullah’s “wisdom and sense of responsibility,” and the Saudi peace initiative has now been characterized as a starting point for Arab-Israeli negotiations by some top Israeli officials.
Relations with Syria are Pivotal
Syria is definitively not within the aforementioned “moderate axis,” and Olmert has stated he has no intention of negotiating a settlement over the Golan Heights until Damascus ends its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Palestinian terrorist groups.
Moreover, US policy appears determined to isolate the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regime, adding another diplomatic layer obstructing Israel-Syrian peace talks. As an Israeli analyst observed, “For Israel to engage with Syria would be to stick a finger in Bush’s eye. It would contradict everything he had done in the last five years in the Middle East” (source).
However, Assad publicly expressed openness toward negotiations with Israel and pointedly differentiated his country’s position from that of his ally in Tehran, stating “I don’t say that Israel should be wiped off the map. We want peace ? peace with Israel” (source). Pursuing peace talks with Syria is clearly in the long-term interests of Israel, and an eventual agreement is a realistically attainable goal. A peace agreement with Syria would drastically improve the regional atmosphere for Israel: Iran’s supply route to Hezbollah would be curtailed; Damascus could use their influence to moderate the actions of Hamas and Hezbollah; and Iran would lose a key cog in its anti-Israel axis.
