Some observers believe that for the past month Hezbollah had been acting at the behest of Iran . The contention was that Hezbollah would never bring such needless disaster upon itself and Lebanon if not for an Iranian guiding hand. However, in the absence of proof that Iran is provoking and fueling the conflict, the thesis remains more conventional wisdom than current analysis. Ascribing Hezbollah’s motivations completely and universally to Iranian design is likely an over simplification.
Iranian military and financial support of Hezbollah is unquestionable. However, this alliance functions like other alliances in the world; sponsorship rarely translates into completed and enduring ownership. Iranian missiles probably come to Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s charismatic and mythically powerful leader, with few strings attached because Iran wants to maintain a powerful deterrent to Israeli aggression on Israel’s northern border. While there may be some modulations in financing to induce good behavior, Hezbollah likely receives as much from the Lebanese expatriate community than it does from Iran.
Nearly all accounts of Nasrallah depict him as an egomaniac, unlikely to accept orders from anyone if they are not in his interest. Evidence of the fact that Iran does not always know what its Lebanese partner is up to was seen following the 9/11 attacks . Iran summoned Nasrallah to Tehran to make ensure that he had had nothing to do with the attacks (source).
The G-8
The timing of Hezbollah’s raid into Israel to coincide with a G-8 meeting at which Iran’s nuclear program was to figure prominently is cited as the reason why Iran initiated the conflict with Israel. However, even if Iran approved the abduction , the subsequent escalation has run counter to Iranian interests. Hezbollah is supposed to be a deterrent force. If Iran was involved in initiating the attack, then it was to give Israel and the world a taste of this deterrent. It is not in Iran’s interest to activate that deterrent completely. The occasion of the G-8 called for a small-scale, temporarily distracting, and ominously threatening incident. It did not merit Iran using up its deterrent in a bloody, brutal conflict that forced Hezbollah to show all of its cards and use up much of its arsenal.
Arab Street
Also, Iran wishes to maintain Hezbollah as an ally because the popularity Hezbollah has in the proverbial Arab street helps bolster Iran’s image in a region in which it hopes to become a primary power. However, Sunni Arabs have not reacted to Hezbollah’s “adventurism” positively, instead seeing pan-Shia conspiracy in Hezbollah’s autonomous decision to initiate another Arab war with Israel. This hurts the very image that Iran wants to build in the Arab world.
It is only Hezbollah that stands to gain from the conflict. If they can portray themselves as repelling the Israeli ground incursion in southern Lebanon, they can reaffirm their standing as the only Arab entity capable of challenging Israel. Hezbollah wants to keep the conflict going in order to prove that, when the Israelis are at the gate, only Hezbollah is equipped to keep them from sacking Lebanon. Hezbollah hopes that the fact that they “started it” will be buried in the shockwaves from Israel’s “disproportionate” response and Hezbollah’s successful resistance to the second major Israeli invasion in recent years. If successful, Hezbollah will justify its continuing existence and its coming attempts at rearmament.
