Like most Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan suppresses Islamic dissidents operating within its borders (source). The Uzbek government takes active charge in combating rebellious uprisings and radical militant groups that try to proliferate. However, recent trends in the country suggest that local extremism is rising (source). Equally concerning, locally active extremist groups are recruiting increasing numbers of youth.
Conditions in Uzbekistan
Although Uzbekistan is a democracy, the United States Department of State, the Council of the European Union, and the world community’s foremost human rights organizations refer to the country as “an authoritarian state with limited civil rights” (source). President Islom Kamirov has twice extended his power and runs the country with absolute control. Thus, the people of Uzbekistan live under harsh circumstances in which many witness injustices: lack of political freedom, fabricated criminal cases, and human rights violations. Uzbekistan is a very poor country, and many citizens do not see the prospective of a positive future. These societal problems are creating animosity among the population–especially young people–leaving the disillusioned to turn to rebel groups to solve social disparities.
Active Groups in Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s extremist groups range from violent to non-violent resistance groups; however, three groups are particularly active and worth noting. Uzbekistan’s societal problems help energize these organizations and contribute to the recruitment of new members.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The most violent radical Islamic group in the country is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; Group Profile). Founded in 1998, their objective was to create an Islamic caliphate in Uzbekistan. They expanded their objective to all of Central Asia in an effort to establish a regional Islamic state referred to as Turkistan. Their senior members were involved in the Soviet-Afghan war, and they are strongly allied to Osama bin Laden. In recent times, they assisted al-Qaeda in launching attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan –a favor that rendered them both financial support from bin Laden and safehaven from the Taliban . Furthermore, the IMU is involved in the Afghan-Central Asia drug trade, granting IMU substantial influence and resources in the region (source).
Islamic Jihad Group in Uzbekistan
A newer group operating in the country is the Islamic Jihad Group in Uzbekistan (IJG; Group Profile). The group splintered from the IMU around 2004 and grew into its own sophisticated organization (source). It was unknown until 2004 when it claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings around Tashkent (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident). The targets included the American and Israeli Embassies, but their main enemy is the authoritarian government of Uzbekistan. The style and superiority of the attacks point toward possible links to al-Qaeda, likely acquired during their association with the IMU. The IJG constitute a proven threat to both Uzbekistan and the international presence in the country, and their aspirations and capabilities seem to be growing.
Hizb ut-Tahrir
The third group that has received attention in Uzbekistan is Hizb ut-Tahrir , which aims to create an Islamic state through non-violent means. Hizb ut-Tahrir is characterized as a terrorist group by the government and is banned in Uzbekistan and in most of the neighboring countries. However, they have not resorted to violent means so far. Although their size and structure remains uncertain, they are known to operate clandestinely across Central Asia. Their recent activities indicate a growth in size of adherents. Their core members are generally youth who display a growing militancy, which could potentially lead to the group’s splintering into violent and non-violent factions (source).
Youth Recruitment’s Threat and Significance
Recent data suggests that many Uzbek youth, in quest of a purpose and a place to belong, are increasingly drawn to extremist groups. Their young age combined with the aggravation of difficult living standards make for a doubly frustrated pool of potential recruits.
It is feasible that the youngest members of Hizb ut-Tahrir will respond violently to the continuing harsh crackdowns by the government. TRC foresees a potential for the creation of a splinter group from Hizb ut-Tahrir that will choose violence to reach their objectives, which may or may not follow the non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology. Furthermore, the IMU and IJG also appreciate the vulnerability of the youth fragments and aggressively exploit the opportunity to recruit more members. TRC predicts a further rise in extremism in Uzbekistan and likely beyond its borders, affecting regional security.
