According to Jason Burke of the UK’s Observer, the upsurge in Taliban offensives in Afghanistan over recent months is reportedly being led by a shadowy triumvirate of commanders known as “the junta.” As Burke reports, the three are: “Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran tribal leader and guerrilla fighter; Mullah Mohammed Omar, the reclusive one-eyed cleric who led the Taliban regime when in power; and the lesser-known Mullah Mohammed Dadullah Akhund, an ultra-violent and media-savvy commander who is emerging as the number-one enemy of coalition and Afghan government forces.”
Dadullah, who has drawn comparisons to the former al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi in terms of battlefield stature and viciousness, is particularly noteworthy as he has reportedly been given command of Taliban forces in the Helmand province and exercises relative operational freedom. Having fought against the Soviets, his reputation as a savage Taliban field commander grew steadily from the 1990s when he commanded forces against the Northern Alliance, with massacres and scorched earth assaults attributed to him. Dadullah is reportedly regarded as guerrilla celebrity, using his notorious persona?in jihadist DVDs on sale in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in person in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province?to recruit jihadists for the Afghanistan insurgency. According to MSNBC reports, Dadullah claimed to have 12,000 men under his command (the US military has said it is only half that number) and commands a cadre of suicide bombers. He reportedly commands mostly local fighters and uses his contacts in Quetta and Chaman to draw recruits. Dadullah’s reported strategic vision is not to wrest control of Afghanistan from the Kabul government and Coalition forces by sheer guerrilla force, but rather, in classic guerrilla form, be a persistent insurgent threat able to avoid decisive defeat and slowly erode the political will of his adversaries to continue the fight.
Haqqani, a venerated Afghan and Taliban guerrilla commander, is said to operate largely in Miramshah, the capital of the North Waziristan province and reportedly runs the eastern front of the Taliban insurgency, with operations in Kabul and the regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia and Paktika. Haqqani has long been suspected of sheltering Osama bin Laden. He is said to have financial backing from wealthy Islamists in the Persian Gulf, and he draws recruits from religious schools he controls.
The degree of attention the three leaders are receiving among coalition military planners gleans their operational import. The Observer reports that in early July, Coalition intelligence officers convened an emergency meeting to “co-ordinate the hunt for the three, who are believed to be behind much of the current upsurge in fighting.” So long as these commanders are at the helm of the Taliban insurgency, Taliban guerrilla offensives will continue to be audacious and robust, and observers believe that taking these leaders out would degrade the Taliban operational capabilities.
However, as past TRC analyses (see June 15, 2005; and May 3, 2006 WAR Reports) noted, the antigovernment insurgency is comprised of a kaleidoscope of militant actors?Taliban, al-Qaeda , drug lords, warlords, and other criminal elements?all operating within an environment of quasianarchy in many of the contested Afghan provinces. In these areas, the government has not been able to extend its writ due to endemic corruption among provincial leaders and a lack of forces. Amoebic nexuses of the militant groups operate in common cause to keep the Afghan government and Coalition presence at bay, consolidate control and operational freedom, and preserve the lucrative drug production and trade. Coalition forces will be compelled to not only go after the Taliban’s “junta” but also fashion a holistic counterinsurgency strategy aimed at rooting out the supportive dimensions of corruption and drug production, depriving militant elements of societal support or exploitation by establishing security and reconstruction initiatives in villages.
