Debates and discussions on Jihadist forums associated with the al-Qaeda movement can provide insight on the way current events are perceived in the broader al-Qaeda ideological movement. As the Internet serves as the primary interface between extremists internationally, Jihadist forums are leveraged to develop and disseminate the evolving international political outlook and to devise scenarios of ideal response from the radical Sunni community.
After an initial silence on the subject of Israel and Lebanon , both religious authorities and the rank and file who use Jihadist forums began to conceptualize the conflict in terms of their own goals in the region. The analyses and discussions reveal anxiety about the power of Shia organizations and Iran in the Middle East and even a level of shame and disappointment that radical Sunni networks could not attack Israel as successfully as Hizballah has. Above all, they perceived a threat presented to Sunni Muslims from Iranian proxies in Iraq and Lebanon and from perceived American proxies in the form of secular Arab governments and Israel.
At first, Jihadist web sites responded excitedly to the idea that the two primary enemies of radical Sunni Muslims?Shias and Jews?were fighting and killing one another. As the conflict continued, more sophisticated analyses appeared portraying the conflict as competing power plays between the US and Iran. In a well-written and much circulated analysis entitled “A Salafi View of What is Happening in Lebanon,” the conflict was characterized as representing two competing plans of the US and Iran to “redraw the map of the larger Middle East.” The competition was characterized as representing a distinct threat to the radical Sunni cause.
In summing up Hizballah’s motivations in initiating the battle, the analysis cited an alleged statement declared by an unidentified Hizballah leader to the Lebanese paper an-Nahar in 1987. When asked if his organization “was a part of Iran,” the leader replied, “we do not say that we are a part of Iran. Rather, we are Iran in Lebanon, and we are Lebanon in Iran.” The analysis compared Iran’s animation of Hizballah to Iran’s use of Shia militias and agents in Iraq to extend control over that country.
Iran, through Shia populations and organizations, is portrayed increasingly in Salafi dialogue as presenting almost as large a threat to the region as the United States . As attacks have been encouraged against Shia in Iraq, such discussion suggests that provocations and calls for sectarian violence against Shia could increase if radical Sunnis feel threatened. The perception of an international Shia threat among Sunni extremists means that incidents of violence targeting Shia could begin to arise outside of Iraq.
