As TRC forecast in these pages, the spiral of sectarian killings in Iraq has accelerated in pace and grown in scope and lethality. These attacks coupled with the increasing levels of forced displacement reminiscent of the systematic ethnic cleansing in recent ethno-nationalist civil wars and the coalescing of sectarian-defined enclaves are three prime indicators that the mechanisms of civil war are in motion and will be difficult to arrest.
The recent wave of sectarian attacks has grown in its brazenness, lethality, targeting scope, and systematic nature. According to a United Nations study, some 6,000 Iraqi civilians have died in these attacks since May. In addition to the growing pace and lethality of sectarian attacks, TRC discussed (June 14 and July 12 WAR Reports) that a trenchant indicator of a trajectory toward civil war is the increasing levels of targeting and forced displacement of Iraqis from minority ethnic-religious communities within mixed or rival sect-dominated areas. According to Iraq’s Migration Ministry, since the bombing of the Shia mosque in Samarra in February 2005 that served as the flashpoint for the ongoing spiral of sectarian killings, 162,000 refugees have registered with the Ministry, with an up tick of 30,000 registering since the beginning of July 2006 alone. The actual figures are likely much higher, as the Ministry accounts for only those who have formally registered; many flee abroad or seek refuge with relatives rather than formally applying for aid. The forced migrations and displacement reportedly are nation-wide and among all sects.
These dynamics are hallmarks of a form of ethnic cleansing?such as that witnessed in the Balkan conflicts?that polarize, segregate, and fragment the country into insulated sectarian-defined enclaves. Ethno-religious tensions are underpinned with perceptions of immediate threat from the rival sects and are motivated by suspicion, vendetta, and life-and-death communal defense. Once sectarian communities become segregated into enclaves, rival sects are more easily demonized and violence against them more easily committed as daily interactions that might humanize and temper the demonizing narrative are diminished. This sets the conditions for an escalatory spiral of security dilemmas and conflict between rival communities. As these spiraling dynamics grow, the sectarian enclaves and their combativeness will grow increasingly entrenched. Further, remaining sectarian minorities within these enclaves will likely face violence and intimidation in an effort to remove their threat of serving as an insurgent or ‘fifth column’ grouping.
The al-Maliki government’s touted grand security clampdown in Baghdad, involving a robust deployment of Iraqi and US forces, has failed. As a central battleground of the sectarian conflict, the efficacy of strategies to arrest the sectarian conflict in Baghdad will prove illustrative of prospects for success in other areas of Iraq. Unless the sectarian killings can be tempered to create space for confidence and peace-building measures between sectarian communities and elements of al-Maliki’s reconciliation plan gain traction, the mechanisms of sectarian civil war will be set in irrecoverable motion.
