While a large amount of its military resources will be used up or destroyed, Hizballah will survive the current conflict and will rebuild its infrastructure as soon as hostilities cease. While Israel works on weakening Hizballah’s military resources and capabilities, only the Lebanese can weaken the organization’s political power within Lebanon . Indications are emerging that non-Shia factions in Lebanon, represented by the Lebanese government, will move to weaken and ostracize Hizballah, following the cessation of the current conflict. Successfully marginalizing Hizballah within Lebanon will require a campaign to both create internal political conflicts within Hizballah and weaken its hold over its base of support: Lebanese Shia.
Elements of the Lebanese government reacted with concern over comments by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s comments in televised appearances. Him saying that the conflict is battle for the sake of the Islamic Ummah sent angry shockwaves through many Lebanese who, according to the Lebanese paper al-Mustaqbal, do not want their “land used to play out international or sectarian conflicts.” Nasrallah made a vague response to comments, mainly one by Saad Hariri, that Hizballah “be held accountable” for what they have wrought on Lebanon. The newspaper of the leading Future party reported that Nasrallah was altering the discussion around his “accountability” to imply that he and his party should be awarded more political power should Lebanon emerge victorious. Whatever the outcome, Hizballah will spin it as a success, to renew their much touted titles as defenders of Lebanon and the only Arab force capable of staving off Israel.
Indications are beginning to show that Hizballah has miscalculated how their private war, launched on their own behalf, Palestinians, Iran , and the rest of the “Islamic Ummah,” will play with the Lebanese. The Christians and the Sunnis will likely gang up on Hizballah after this conflict, angry that the government they elected to represent them was left out of the monumental decision to engage in “open war,” according to Nasrallah, with Israel. Government ministers meeting with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora complained publicly that the government was not “the Red Cross” and would not have its role reduced to societal and humanitarian functions. Additionally, Siniora’s words last week reflected extreme dissatisfaction with Hizballah. Nasrallah has had to moderate his usual power-hungry language with overtures to Lebanese government sovereignty, affirming on al-Jazeera that the responsibility of negotiating over hostages and an end to the conflict was the responsibility of the Lebanese government.
The way that the Lebanese government will attack Hizballah following this conflict will not resemble the rapid and forceful way that Syria was pushed out. Rather, the government will work to support internal divisions within Hizballah’s organizational structure in order to weaken Nasrallah’s power and create disruptive fractures within the leadership ranks. Meanwhile, other Lebanese factions will work to balance against Hizballah in the political realm.
The largest factor in the success of this slower, more subtle strategy is the Lebanese Shia population. Ultimately, separating Hizballah from its base of support is the only way to pulverize it. The Lebanese government will have to convince the Shia population that Hizballah brought this damage upon itself and them. Also, the Lebanese government, with the support of the international community, must help Lebanon’s Shia survive and rebuild. If Hizballah alone undertakes this monumental task, the organization could come out of this conflict with even stronger Shia support than before.
