Assem Hammoud, the alleged mastermind of the recently uncovered plot to bomb subway tunnels in New York , has been called the ideal al-Qaeda recruit for his cover as a westernized, boozing, womanizing Lebanese who secretly pledged allegiance (biya’ or bayat) to Osama bin Laden, supposedly gathering information on maintaining an effective non-religious cover from al-Qaeda training manuals.
The story of Hammoud’s “recruitment” remains mysterious. While references to al-Qaeda recruiting individuals like Hammoud have accompanied this story, the actual process of modern day recruitment of fighters is likely more complicated than that. Two stories are plausible. The first explanation is that Hammoud was recruited in the traditional sense by al-Qaeda operatives in Lebanon . The second explanation, the one toward which most evidence points, is that Hammoud was recruited over the Internet.
The idea that Hammoud may have been recruited comes from contacts he had with a Jordanian named Hany al-Shanti and a Lebanese named Hassan Nab’a. Both men were part of a ring of 13 linked to al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers who were revealed to be plotting attacks in Lebanon . However, there has been no indication that these men recruited Hammoud; he seems rather to have recruited himself as a soldier for the cause before he had contact with them.
Hammoud grew up in an area of Beirut not known for Islamic militancy. His entrée into the world of radical Islam seems to have occurred primarily through the vast Jihadist presence online. In this virtual world, Hammoud would have been able to access the latest writings and speeches of the senior visionaries of the Jihadist movement and to make connections with their legions of followers. He would also be able to access what amounts to a database of terrorist knowledge, including al-Qaeda manuals instructing him in maintaining a convincing cover and technical information on how to carry out terrorist attacks. Exposure to such information may have inspired Hammoud and helped him form the contours of his terrorist plot.
The Internet provided Hammoud with a way to interface with an international community of radicals. Prior to the development of the Jihadist community online, Hammoud would have had to travel to terrorist training camps in the Middle East or Central Asia or to the “Jihad” in Iraq in order to make international connections with like-minded individuals. Without the online community to receive the encouragement and reinforcement for his extremist beliefs, he would have had to be seen going to the local hard-line mosque or meeting with members of an Islamist group in Lebanon. Hammoud was able to bypass physical meetings and travels by tapping into the vibrant world of extremist Islam online.
This is how recruiting over the Internet typically functions. Online recruiting does not happen in the sense that an active al-Qaeda operative located in Afghanistan or Iraq signs on to ask members of a chat room to volunteer for a particular attack. These sites provide Arabic speakers globally with access to the world of radical Islam: its ideology, its visionaries, its adherents. Once people are absorbed into this vibrant virtual community, they have access to the technical knowledge needed to carry out terrorism, to include explosive instructions, instructional videos, and tactical and targeting guidance. The motivated and entrepreneurial among them will use this information to plot and engineer their own attacks.
The online community are not members of al-Qaeda in the strictest sense, but they have come to understand the strategy and ideology provided by the movement, and they follow the examples and the game plan that al-Qaeda has established. They are motivated by the virtual radical community, which is clamoring for more violence, and they have the approval of al-Qaeda’s religious leadership in the form of fatwas and statements calling for terrorist attacks against “the enemies of Islam.”
Once indoctrinated, members of the virtual community encourage each other to use the knowledge available online, as well as their own wits and resources, to find trustworthy people to form a cell and plot an attack. However, recruiting for a specific attack from the Jihadist sites, among contacts made over the Internet, is often discouraged because of the security risks. This is a risk that Hammoud ignored.
Hammoud’s recruiting and exchange of detailed information about his plot with contacts met over the Internet was his undoing; it is a testament to the ability of intelligence agencies to adapt to confront an enemy that will carry out terrorist activities in virtual space rather than in the real world. However, Hammoud’s method of direct recruiting in cyberspace is atypical and goes against the advice given on a number of Jihadist sites. Judging from their discussions, most “online Jihadists” use their online connections to gain technical or tactical information without divulging too much information about their intentions.
Information and advice available on Jihadist sites on the formation of terrorist cells does not recommend direct recruiting over the Internet, as Hammoud did. His example and his arrest will likely serve as a warning to other members of radical Islam’s virtual community to avoid exchanging too many details over the Internet. However, the massive effort at indirect recruiting and the maintenance of an online database of terrorist technical knowledge will continue to sow threats all over the world.
