Syrian President Bashar Asad’s concern over an increased al-Qaeda presence in Lebanon and rising Islamic militancy within Syria is unsurprising, given Syria’s tumultuous history with the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of religious extremism throughout the region. However, Asad’s intent is to exaggerate the extremist threat as a means to dissipate international and domestic pressure, and fortify control over Syria for himself, his family, and the minority Syrian Alawi (a Muslim sect that incorporates Sunni, Shi’a, and other religious traditions).
Within Syria, Asad describes a militant threat comprised of small, localized cells that share an ideological – not operational – affiliation with al-Qaeda. These militants are “inspired” by the American occupation of Iraq , including some militants who have fought there and returned to Syria. Indeed, it a homegrown cell model that is sweeping the Levant (source). Additionally, radical Islam regards Asad’s Alawite sect as infidels, and therefore a target; documentation captured in Afghanistan revealed al-Qaeda’s frustration that Syria’s Sunni majority had not yet revolted and removed the Alawi from power. Syrian security forces have engaged Islamic militants on multiple occasions, notably during a December 2005 raid that uncovered a bomb making factory in a farmhouse and a raid in Damascus on June 2, 2006 in which 4 militants and one police officer were killed.
By highlighting their battles with Islamic extremists, the Syrian government is attempting to endear themselves to the United States , who has consistently pressured Syria over its support for terrorism and interference in Lebanon. Syria’s emphasis on the presence of a radical Islamic threat is a reminder to the international community that regime change would be counter-productive — a secular Baathist regime with all its faults is still more preferable than a reconstituted Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Likewise, Asad’s description of al-Qaeda’s recent growth in Lebanon implies that Syria was preventing such an outcome with its previous military occupation.
Domestically, drawing attention to the threat of Islamic militants allows the Syrian regime to justify its harsh crackdown on democracy activists and political opposition in the name of national security. At a time when the government is battling Islamic militants in the streets of Damascus, the government can categorize activists’ call for internal reform as inappropriate or dangerous behavior. The regime can also group the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in with the militants, despite the former’s renunciation of violence, potentially lessening the appeal of their historic political rival. On cue, the state controlled media – which rarely discusses security issues – provided immediate coverage of the June 2nd gun battle, reinforcing a threat perception for its Syrian audience.
Stymied by an inability to enact meaningful economic or social reform, President Asad needs the outlet of foreign crises and security threats to legitimize his regime, as did his father before him. As the Syrian dissident Ammar Abdulhamid has illustrated (source), it is a model for sustaining governmental power for the Asads – as a leading family of the Syrian Alawis – and for the minority Alawite sect, who are entrenched atop the country’s military and security hierarchy.
