The systematic, brazen, and bloody nature of a spasm of sectarian revenge attacks in Iraq on July 8-9 will likely serve to exacerbate the ongoing spiral of sectarian attacks and to hasten a headlong rush among Iraq’s militant sectarian groups toward civil war.
The primary militant actors involved in the attacks are reportedly Shia militia, largely thought to be part of the Shia Mahdi Army militia loosely led by rebel Shia cleric-turned influential national political figure, Moqtada al-Sadr . Mahdi Army fighters are accused of raiding the Sunni al-Jihad neighborhood of Baghdad, marauding through the streets and pulling suspected Sunnis from cars, buses, and homes, killing many on the spot. Mahdi fighters are also accused of setting up roadblocks at which Iraqis were forced to show identification, revealing their name and tribe, all of which would indicate their Sunni or Shia affiliation. Some bodies found after the raids showed signs of torture. Alaa Makky, a Sunni member of parliament quoted by the Washington Post, commented on the spasm of violence, saying, “This is a new step. A red line has been crossed.” Makky went on to say, “People have been killed in the streets; now they are killed inside their homes.”
The attacks seem to come as a riposte to a series of attacks and incursions against the Shia community and the Mahdi Army over the past weeks, including a car bombing in recent weeks in Sadr City area of Baghdad and this weekend’s car bombing of the Shia al-Zahra mosque , resulting in what the Washington Post describes as a “door-to-door pursuit of Sunnis by Shiites.”
Sadr has called for calm, striking a nationalist-liberation and populist tone, saying in a statement quoted by the Washington Post, “Iraq is passing through a critical phase and a worsening security situation in spite of the presence of an independent government. I call on all parties, both governmental and popular, to exercise self-control first, and to shoulder their responsibility before God and society.” As quoted by the Los Angeles Times, Sadr’s statement went on to shift blame for the violence onto “Western” influences, calling on “political and religious forces to hamper the Western scheme of patronizing a civil war between brothers.” Officials in Sadr’s organization condemned the violence and denied the Mahdi Army’s involvement.
Recent muscular countermilitia operations by US forces and those of the al-Maliki government against Mahdi Army strongholds resulted in the capture of two senior Mahdi Army leaders. Within this context, this weekend’s attacks by the Mahdi Army militia may represent a show of force by Sadr against the US and Iraqi government’s countermilitia initiatives, signaling that the militia will fight to maintain their power against US and Iraqi government incursions.
Further, the militia could be acting at Sadr’s intentional or tacit behest, with Sadr calling for calm and pushing his nationalist liberation agenda as a means of demonstrating his political influence over the Mahdi Army and segments of the Shia community while avoiding overt operational and political involvement in the violence. Sadr may be demonstrating that the foundational grist of his national political power remains viable and potent and that he and his militia remain a bullwark communal defense force for the Shia constituency. In doing so, Sadr and the Mahdi Army serve to revitalize their rebel ‘street creds’ among their supporters, reminding the US and the Iraqi government that they remain central players in Iraq’s political, security, and stability landscape and are willing to fight to maintain this position. It is also likely that certain elements of the Mahdi Army may be acting on their own as part of the revenge attacks.
Iranian elements, possibly linked to Iraq’s Shia community and militias, may be involved in instigating or directing some Shia militia violence, possibly as a means of retaliating for a bombing that targeted Iranian pilgrims in the Shia holy city of Kufa thought to have been perpetrated by Sunni insurgents. Further, Iran may be attempting to demonstrate their political and militant influence in Iraq among insurgent proxies in an effort to establish a credible threat to US forces in Iraq as a lever of power and deterrence. This lever will likely feature in any escalation in the standoff with the US over Iran’s nuclear capacity development and would be an instrument of retaliation against US forces in Iraq following any perceived US threat or attack.
Further, as noted in the July 6 WAR Report, jihadists associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq may be clandestinely at play, seeking to carry on the strategy of stoking sectarian conflict among Iraq’s Shia and Sunni communities through attacks against the Shia community in the hope of provoking severe retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.
The upsurge in sectarian violence is particularly worrying due to its brazen ferocity and systematic nature: marauding attacks against Sunnis beginning early in the morning, pulling victims from vehicles and homes, and utilizing checkpoints to identify victims. When examined against the backdrop of large numbers of forced migrations from mixed areas of Iraq (first covered in the April 5 WAR Report) under intimidation by rival sectarian militias, these dynamics represent early indicators of a systematic campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and a spiraling dynamic of ethic-religious revenge attacks that will not only prove difficult to stop but may also lead to civil war. The violence promises to accelerate this spiraling dynamic and drive Iraq closer to civil war, as Sunni insurgents or communal militias are likely to mount counteroffensives in the coming days.
As Iraqi and US forces move to confront militias in Iraq, it can be expected that the militias will not go quietly. In particular, attacks on the Mahdi Army will likely compel Sadr move to a more rebellious footing, likely stepping up his Shia empowerment and nationalist-liberation rhetoric and his militia’s insurgent activities against the US and the Iraqi government. The future may see a more rebellious, bellicose, and potentially insurgent Sadr and his Mahdi Army.
