The Israeli assault on targets in Lebanon has sparked two strange and contradictory dynamics among the Lebanese population. The first is the impulse for the national community to galvanize against attacks by an outside force. The second is anger and divisiveness leveled at the parties within Lebanon considered responsible for provoking the Israeli onslaught. Which of the two impulses dominates Lebanese power holders will determine whether Hizballah emerges from the situation more powerful or if Lebanon will move with strength into the grueling process to strip the Shia militia of power and, eventually, of arms.
The leading party in the Lebanese parliament, the Future Movement, has reacted with anger at both Hizballah and Israel . On July 17, the newspaper published by the party pointed the finger at Israel with an angry front page article accusing Israel of using cluster bombs and “illegal phosphorus bombs.” However, later in the day, the impulse to blame Hizballah emerged when the party’s leader, Saad Hariri, told a Saudi newspaper that Hizballah should be “held accountable because they led the country into a crisis.” On the same day, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora expressed similar sentiments in an impassioned speech to the Lebanese people. The worst of his criticism was reserved for Israel, whose “criminal war machine” he condemned. However, Siniora’s words contained a strong message for Hizballah; he referred to the right to protect Lebanon from any threat or attack as belonging solely to the Lebanese government. “Lebanon cannot grow and develop if the government is the last to know and yet the first to pay the price,” he said. He also implicitly criticized Hizballah’s unilateral decision to attack Israel: “The [Lebanese] government alone can make the decision of taking this country to war and peace because it represents the will of the Lebanese.” Siniora called on the implementation of the Taif Accord, a euphemistic way of promoting Hizballah’s disarmament (a condition of the Accord).
If Hizballah continues to put its new and improved rocket capabilities on display over northern Israeli population centers like Haifa and Israel pursues measured retaliation for the ongoing assault, then the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government may be galvanized against Hizballah, much the same way that the assassination of Rafiq Hariri prompted the country to unite against Syria . The danger is that a rising death toll and fading Israeli targeting discretion will erode the Lebanese government’s will to disarm the militia. Hizballah may be calculating for this outcome: the Lebanese population will see in the Israeli-inflicted destruction a real need for Hizballah as a defender of the country, and they will ignore the original provocation of the conflict once confronted with the scope of Israel’s “disproportionate” retaliation. This is how up to 80% of Lebanon’s Shia community, comprising one third of the population, will see it. To them, Hizballah is their defender not only against Israel, but also against bullying and marginalization by other, wealthier groups in Lebanon. But, however much Hizballah is hoping to paint its current role to all of Lebanon, non-Shia factions are not likely to buy it. When the fire stops and the dust settles on this conflict, other factions in Lebanon will turn on Hizballah.
Hizballah has pushed all the right buttons with the non-Shia Lebanese, declaring that it is fighting this battle for “all of the [Islamic] Ummah,” referring to the pan-Islamic community. The Lebanese are particularly sensitive to having their territory used as a battle ground for conflicts between outside parties. “The war that we are witnessing now is a war between Syria, Iran, and Israel,” declared Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and much of Lebanon’s Druze community. Jumblatt also addressed Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, warning him that “Lebanon is not Gaza,” an apparent reference to Hizballah’s declarations that is also fighting on behalf of the Palestinians.
Other Lebanese factions will gang up on the wayward Shia militia following this conflict, but they may not have the will to disarm Hizballah. According to one poll conducted prior to the conflict, only one-third of Sunnis supported disarming Hizballah in the absence of a regional peace agreement with Israel. Only 18% of Maronite Christians supported disarming Hizballah without Hizballah’s agreeing to be disarmed (source). The poll helps shed light on why Hizballah was allowed to assume so much political power in Lebanon without being forced to shed its arsenal.
Given Hizballah’s strength, it is unclear whether it is feasible to disarm the group without provoking violent conflict. Hizballah is estimated to have a force of between 2,000?5,000, while the Lebanese military has around 72,100 active duty forces (source). However, it is unlikely the Lebanese government will think that martial conflict with Hizballah is a price worth paying for disarmament. The most aggressive action that will likely be pursued by the Lebanese government is to politically isolate Hizballah in Lebanon.
The international community will have something to say about the issue. During and after the 2005 so-called Cedar Revolution, most western nations were willing to drop the issue of Hizballah disarmament in light of the greater victory of a Syrian withdrawal. That is set to change. Even other Arab nations are turning a cold shoulder to Hizballah, associating the group’s “adventurism” with Islamist movements in their own nations that endeavors to break their home governments’ monopoly on the use of force. But, even if the much discussed multinational “stabilization forces” are sent to the region, forcibly disarming Hizballah will not be part of their mission.
In the near-term, only one party in the region will strip Hizballah of even one weapon. Israel is using the opportunity to do what it knows Lebanon will not. Hizballah’s installations, offices, and its estimated arsenal of 8,000?10,000 rockets are the targets. So far, the Israeli army believes that it has destroyed between 40-50% of Hizballah’s military capacity (source). Parties within the Israeli military have said that they need another week to achieve minimum goals in eroding Hizballah’s capabilities. A week is about the length of time, according to a chief Israeli intelligence officer, that Israel thinks it has before major international pressure emerges for a ceasefire. Israel, and even elements in Lebanon, are likely hoping that the next Hizballah issue that the Lebanese will tackle is the prevention of rearmament, an easier task than the forcible disarmament that Lebanon is to far too fragile to undertake.
