Assuming that the translation from the office of Iraq?s National Security Advisor, Mowafaq al-Rubaie, is accurate, and that the sentiment and appraisal found within the document accurately reflects reality, its content offers a fascinating and advantageous insight into the strategic mindset, and organizational and operational fitness of the insurgency. There remain questions as to the authenticity, authorship, and perspective of the document?namely if it is written exclusively from the jihadist, al Qaeda in Iraq perspective, or is a more overarching view of the insurgency as a whole. However, given that the document is sourced to al Qaeda elements, it is likely that the appraisal is predominantly from the jihadist perspective.
The translation, as quoted by the Christian Science Monitor, states that, “?Massive arrest operations? have caused the resistance to ?lose many of its elements??.? According to this assessment, and likely compounded by the recent large scale counterterrorism sweeps against Zarqawi?s network, jihadist insurgent ranks have likely experienced significant erosion and disruption.
A significant theme of the appraisal is an appreciation that US and Iraqi efforts to cleave insurgents, and primarily foreign jihadists, from local popular support and to stoke disruptions between and among jihadist and Iraqi insurgent groups are having a significant effect. This counterinsurgency strategy – discussed at length in these pages – centers on underscoring the threat posed to Iraqis? immediate security and long-term political goals by the jihadists? brutal and ferocious tactics and their dissonant strategic goal of establishing a Caliphate in Iraq. The Zarqawi jihadists? predilection for large scale and indiscriminate bombings and attacks that kill innocent Iraqi civilians, many of whom the various Sunni and Iraqi nationalist groups perceive as their constituency, has turned many Iraqis, Sunnis, and some Sunni insurgent groups against the foreign jihadists. US and Iraqi counterinsurgency strategies have sought to isolate the jihadists from popular and Sunni insurgent support by portraying Zarqawi and his fighters as menacing foreigners killing Iraqis, and by seeking to entice the more politically and nationalist motivated Sunni insurgents into demobilization in return for political empowerment. The document, paraphrased by the Christian Science Monitor suggests, ?Insurgents are at a further disadvantage by the growing number of trained Iraqi forces, are losing a media campaign ?presenting its work as harmful to the population,? and suffering from tighter financial restrictions.? The document notes that ?the result is that US and Iraqi tactics are ?creating a big division among the ranks of the resistance and jeopardizing its attack operations,? which have ?weakened [insurgent] influence? ?.?
These issues paint a picture of the strategic, organizational, and operational strains facing the jihadist camp of the insurgency, from a degradation of fighting ranks, to an apparent drying up of financial resources, to an increasing isolation from popular support as a result of the counterinsurgency information operations campaign. The jihadists? apparent recognition of and concern for these issues raises the potential that they will make a push to resolve them, likely through efforts that cultivate greater societal and Sunni insurgent support, which, in turn, might yield the operational resources and assistance they apparently desperately need.
Thus, as insurgents regroup following the death of Zarqawi and the wave of counterterrorism operations against his network, and as new leaders within the al Qaeda in Iraq and wider jihadist network assume control, observers may witness a pivoting of jihadist insurgent strategy and operations away from the brutal and indiscriminant attacks of Zarqawi?s tenure. A new strategic orientation may seek to ingratiate jihadists to nationalist Sunni insurgents and the Iraqi population in order to increase the likelihood of winning their much needed operational assistance and collaboration. In so doing, jihadists will likely attempt to establish permissive areas of operations to operate and plan clandestinely, invigorate recruitment to replenish ranks, tap into potential societal funding streams, and ultimately strengthen jihadist insurgent activities.