The convergence of terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC) has begun finally to receive attention from national governments and international organizations. Although a nexus is not an entirely new phenomena, the growing preponderance of linkages has attracted the attention of both US and Canadian intelligence communities. However, as discussed in the April 5, 2006 WAR Report, the utilization of criminal enterprises by terrorist organizations, although still ongoing, may be diminishing, as terrorist organizations are increasingly bypassing international criminal organizations and opting to engage directly in activities that were historically outside the confines of terrorist operations.
Such specialization in criminal ventures can be seen throughout the ideological spectrum of terrorist organizations, as such activities are not the exclusive workings of anyone one group. The ever-increasing need for diversification within the terrorist financial sphere has dramatically escalated since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ensuing curtailment of funds that accompanied the end of the Cold War. The manner in which national and international terrorist organizations have chosen to secure funding, however, has differed in minor respects.
Throughout the 1980s leftist guerrilla groups in Latin America and Middle Eastern Islamic extremists benefited substantially from illicit narcotics operations. The FARC historically engaged in narco-trafficking in conjunction with both the Cali and Medell?n drug cartels but are now becoming increasingly self-dependent, eliminating the sharing of profits. However, this reduction in force has resulted in the formation of another symbiotic relationship. Al-Qaeda’s direct involvement within the Colombian and Peruvian narcotics trade has grown in sophistication and frequently includes the arms-for-drugs deals with the FARC and the ELN . Although leftist insurgencies of Latin America and Islamic extremists groups were long considered ideologically incompatible, ideological belief sets are less relevant as both groups have much to gain from a business relationship.
Islamic militant groups view the globalization of narco-terrorism as both a financial and strategic maneuver. Author Rachel Ehrenfeld has termed the policy “jihad by drugs.” Ehrenfeld states “jihad by drugs appears to be one of the terrorists’ most favored methods because it also helps undermine targeted countries politically and economically, while creating a public health crisis.” However, unlike the FARC, al-Qaeda requires the services of organized crime syndicates in the Balkans to transport heroin shipments?made from Afghan poppy?into the European Union. The sale of heroin in the EU supports the Albanian Islamist network and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and assists both groups in acquiring arms through international black arms markets.
Likewise, Hizballah has officially sanctioned the drug trade through a religious fatwa saying, “We are making these drugs for Satan America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs.” Hashish grown in the Bekka Valley is transited to the EU, and the profits are used to finance Hizballah community projects throughout Lebanon .
The large influx of Muslim extremists in Latin America’s Tri Border region, in combination with the general lawlessness that encompasses the area, has allowed for various illicit enterprises to flourish. Such activities are often undertaken in combination with various TOCs, including the Chinese Triads and the Russian Mafia. According to the US Congressional Research Service, the Tri Border region represents a prime hub of terrorist financial activities and poses a considerable threat to the stability of the area while allowing a base of operations for international terrorist organizations operating in the western hemisphere. Giuliano Zaccardelli, of the Royal Canadian Mountain Police, in testimony before the Canadian Senate’s defense committee, recognized the sophisticated criminal enterprises that terrorist organizations engage in within the Tri Border region, activities that are more common among TOCs than Islamic extremists groups. The US Department of Homeland Security announced in March 2006 the formation of Trade Transparency Units (TTUs)?in conjunction with local law enforcement and customs officials in Argentina , Brazil and Paraguay ?to combat trade-based money laundering and other financial crimes within the Tri Border region. All of the above examples amplify the growing prowess of terrorism financing operations.
The above examples are not rare occurrences, unique to a handful of leftist guerrilla groups or Islamic extremists groups. A substantial portion of recognized national and international terrorist organizations fund a significant portion of their operations through illicit criminal activity, either in conjunction with a TOC or independently. By directly targeting illegal operations, governments can reduce the financial means of these groups. To target active militant cadres while failing to diminish the robust funding of these organizations severely hampers any success that the international community may have in eliminating possible threats.
