The Los Angeles Times report on the discovery of flash drives being sold at a local bazaar in Afghanistan allegedly containing US military intelligence related to ongoing counterinsurgency operations and local intelligence sources in Afghanistan, would represents a trove of insight on these operations and assessments of counterinsurgency issues to both the media and insurgent elements. The nature of the information and the quick response of the military to buy up remaining flash drives and launch an investigation suggests that that the intelligence is authentic.
According the author of the LA Times report, Paul Watson, the memory drives contain the names of Afghan agents working for the US and ??the identities of US military personnel working in Afghanistan, assessments of targets, descriptions of American bases and their defenses, and maneuvers by the US to remove or marginalize Afghan government officials it considers a problem.? Leaking this information has the potential to imperil the local intelligence agents assisting the US, to necessitate damage control measures to protect them, and to guard against the deleterious effects of the intelligence likely falling (or having fallen) into insurgent hands.
The intelligence does offer compelling insight into US counterinsurgency operations and assessments of insurgent actors and corroborates a number of recent TRC assessments on the insurgency in Afghanistan (Country Profile lists relevant WAR Reports). Important information recovered from the drives centers on the Taliban’s use of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan in the southwest Pakistani borderlands area, as a base of operations. Earlier WAR Reports have noted the building entrenchment of the Taliban in controlling or quasi-governing parts of the borderland region and the attendant operational aid that a supportive or quiescent populace can offer to an insurgent group in establishing overt and clandestine bases of operations. Watson reports that the recovered intelligence included documents based on conversations with informants that described how Afghan recruits were allowed into Pakistan and trained at camps and then returned to Afghanistan for suicide missions. Watson reports that the intelligence material indicates that ?they received eight days of instruction, including the use of soap to mold about 10 pounds of ?nails, bolts, or whatever metal scrap is available? onto the top of a round container filled with explosives to make the blast more lethal?.? This intelligence would seem to reinforce assessments that the Taliban and associated militants are utilizing areas of Pakistan for staging and training grounds and likely the aforementioned areas over which the Taliban is assuming control.
The Times article also supports recent TRC assessments that the Taliban is experiencing operational invigoration from an infusion of financial and materiel support?possibly from al-Qaeda leadership elements?as well as mujihedeen fighters from the region and fighters from the insurgency in Iraq . On this topic, Watson notes that an Afghan source reported that Arabs?mostly Yemenis and Syrians?were being channeled through Quetta en route to conducting suicide bombings in Afghanistan. As Watson quotes from an intelligence report contained in one of the drives, ?The aspiring suicide bombers are initially trained by insurgency elements in Iraq, and then moved through Iran to Quetta where they are staged prior to transportation into Afghanistan.? According to Watson, the intelligence also reportedly marks eight ??major infiltration routes? for al-Qaeda and Taliban forces crossing from Pakistan into eastern and southern Afghanistan.?
The TRC analysis suggested that the proliferation of operatives trained within the Iraq insurgency into the Taliban will likely lead to an enhancement of the Taliban?s operational capabilities and potency as ?state of the art? insurgent-terrorist tradecraft and weaponeering expertise from Iraq is infused. The upsurge in suicide attacks in Afghanistan is cited as a likely indicator of the proliferation of Iraq insurgency tactics and operatives into Afghanistan.
Further, Watson quotes an intelligence summary from 2005 that reports that, referring to possible upcoming Taliban attacks, ?Al Qaeda will finance these activities through Mullah Matin, the Taliban finance liaison to Al Qaeda for southern Afghanistan.? The report goes on to say, ?Al Qaeda is financing because they want the Taliban to keep fighting.? This intelligence would support open source reports that have suggested the existence of renewed al-Qaeda operational support for the Taliban. In addition, a recent Washington Post report describes a continuing anarchic environment in many regions of Afghanistanand exploited by a kaleidoscope of militant, criminal, warlord, and drug trafficker elements. In particular, author Pamela Constable notes that Western officials have cited reports of increasing collaboration in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces between Taliban-associated forces and drug traffickers, suggesting that some revenue from drug production may be financing Taliban operations.
Thus, the nexus and interplay of these factors?the infusion of operatives trained and battle-hardened within the insurgency in Iraq and with them potent Iraq insurgency-honed terrorist-insurgent tradecraft; al-Qaeda financial and possibly materiel and operational support for Taliban operations; possible financial support for Taliban operations from drug revenue; the entrenching of Taliban strongholds and bases of operations and training camps within a seemingly permissive environment in and around Quetta and the borderlands region; the exploitation of continued anarchic hinterlands of much of Afghanistan?would all indicate that the Taliban are well positioned and equipped to mount a robust ?spring offensive? as they have warned. As NATO forces expand their area of operations and possibly take a more aggressive posture toward rooting out Taliban and al Qaeda militants, as well as launching counter-drug operations that might threaten Taliban-allied drug traffickers, Taliban insurgent attacks and confrontations with US and NATO forces are likely to increase in scope, pace, and potency in the coming months. Indeed, recent major Taliban attacks and engagements may represent the early indicators of this trajectory of insurgent operations.
