Whether its reigning in terrorist financing, reforming the hate-laden religious curriculum of its public schools, or stopping young Saudis from traveling to Iraq to blow themselves up, assessments of Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts in different facets of the problem are similar: the Kingdom has made some promising steps but is still not doing enough. That same refrain has been heard once more with regards to Saudi Arabia?s efforts to counter terrorist financing, especially regarding the funds that go into Islamic charities and end up in the hands of terrorists in Iraq, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.
On April 4, Stuart Levey , Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, gave remarks at a Senate hearing on Saudi Arabia?s progress on this issue. His remarks also followed this theme, pointing out progress while providing caveats. He noted that funding is still going to insurgents in Iraq and to Southeast Asia, and Saudi Arabia has yet to stand up an institution for oversight of its charities, as it has promised.
Saudi Arabia has taken a half-hearted approach to oversight of its Islamic charities. For instance, while it has put restrictions on charity money leaving the country, it has procrastinated on standing up the promised Financial Intelligence Unit to oversee the charities. In her Senate testimony on Saudi terrorism financing in October, 2005, Rachel Bronson of the Council of Foreign Relations pointed out a problematic quirk in Saudi Arabia?s approach to the oversight of its charities (source). International Islamic institutions based in the Kingdom with charitable components?like the Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the International Islamic Relief Organization?are not considered charities but rather multinational organizations by the Kingdom. Though these are some of the organizations that are suspected of financing terrorism, the designation creates a definitional loophole.
Examples such as that imply a desire to put up a fa?ade of being proactive while keeping the back door open for human and material support of terrorism to leave the Kingdom. Part of the problem is a certain degree of apathy in Saudi Arabia regarding the exporting of terrorism or money for terrorists. As it is often pointed out, Saudi Arabia only started to get serious about counterterrorism after it was itself attacked. The number of Saudis involved in the 9/11 attacks did little to provoke any action, but the Kingdom started to address the problem after the May 2003 compound bombings in Riyadh . Levey implied during the Senate hearing that, when the Saudis are fighting al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia , they are still fighting al-Qaeda . However, Saudi efforts to stop violence inside the Kingdom are not enough, especially when Saudi terrorists have killed far more people outside of their country than inside of it.
A large part of the debate focuses on how the US should deal with Saudi Arabia. Right now, mixed signals are being sent. The US praises the country on one measure and slaps it on the wrist for failing at another. Some might argue this is classic carrot-and-stick diplomacy, while others say it is sending conflicting signals. The rollercoaster of US reactions to Saudi Arabia has been clear over the past several months. Relations were icier last fall because of US accusations about the role of Saudis in the Iraqi insurgency, but, in November, this improved when Condoleezza Rice approached the Saudis with a new ?strategic dialogue,? and she and her Saudi counterpart pledged more cooperation . Then, in January, US officials were once again making hardline comments about Saudi foot-dragging on key counterterrorism initiatives . According to Bronson, individual incidents, such as the decision to withhold just $25,000 in military funding from Saudi Arabia or a mixed reaction from the US to Saudi Arabia?s accession to the WTO have been negatively received in the Kingdom. Bronson also argued in her comments that the ?anti-Saudi bashing that continues to permeate the American political debate? was proving counterproductive in encouraging more counterterrorism action from the Kingdom.
On the other hand, taking pressure off the Saudis is not likely to be productive, either. The staccato progress of counterterrorism efforts and the failure of the Kingdom to address its terrorism problem until May 2003?when al-Qaeda decided to bite the hand that fed it?has given the impression that the Kingdom is only acting now is because of international pressure. Still, the American response to Saudi Arabia needs to be coordinated strategically to achieve specific goals and should not consist of a series of ad hoc reactions to incremental developments in facets of the counterterrorism fight.
