The Washington, DC area, like almost every other regions of the country, spent the federal homeland security funding following the 9/11 attacks , buying equipment because that was about the only thing the federal bureaucracy allowed to be purchased. In 2002 and 2003, the federal government then sent millions of dollars to state and local jurisdictions to purchase personal protective, chemical detection, and decontamination equipment. When the local jurisdictions had filled their warehouses with protective suits, boots, and gloves, they turned their attention to more expensive and exotic equipment. High-speed patrol boats with sophisticated underwater side-looking radar detection gear, aircraft platforms with similar equipment, and state-of-the-art mobile command centers were allowed to be purchased from prescribed authorized purchase lists. However, little funding was provided for training or exercises with the newly purchased equipment, and less funding was provided to develop plans for the employment of that equipment. Lip service was paid to the development of regional plans.
The article correctly points out that the Washington, DC area still lacks a compatible communications network; again, this mirrors the rest of the nation. Over the past 50 years, as public safety agencies equipped their departments with communications equipment, they bought what they could afford and what was aggressively marketed by the radio communication industry. There was no strategic vision or plan for a region to obtain a compatible communication network. This acquisition process has lead to a variety of non-compatible equipment being used in city and county police and fire departments. This non-compatibility is fine as long as the departments do not have to respond to an incident in a coordinated fashion. In almost every jurisdiction today, at large emergencies, it is not unusual to find city and county police and fire departments trying to provide an effective response to the same incident and not being able to talk to each other due precisely to this non-compatibility problem. Additionally, the automation of many tasks performed by public safety agencies have further exacerbated problems with non-compatible computer-aided dispatch, booking, fingerprint, and other related database systems. These legacy radio and computer systems have grown and evolved and will be very difficult and expensive to replace.
The events of 9/11 are now almost five years removed, with attacks beginning to fade from the collective memory or are being replaced with other pressing issues of the day. The political finger pointing from Hurricane Katrina continues with little being done to fix the deficiencies noted during the response. The development of regional plans will be as difficult to implement as the development and implementation of compatible regional communications systems. It will take a clearly articulated vision for a long-term solution, coupled with strong leadership and a disciplined approach, starting at the federal level working through the states and a collective spirit of cooperation at all levels. Until the leadership is provided and a clearly defined approach is given, this nation will continue to grapple with regional all hazard response planning.