Four days after the March 7, 2006 coordinated attacks on India’s religious capital, Varanasi (aka Benares), a previously unknown self-proclaimed Kashmiri separatist group, Lashkar-e-Qahab , claimed responsibility. Despite Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s (LeT) subsequent denial, Indian authorities have revealed the modus operandi of the Varanasi attack closely follows that of a similar wave of attacks attributed to LeT in New Delhi on October 29, 2005 .
LeT, too, is a Kashmiri separatist group founded in 1989 and based in Pakistan , despite being outlawed by President Pervez Musharraf in 2002. Like the October New Delhi attack, the Varanasi strike occurred only days before a significant Hindu religious holiday. Whereas the 2005 attack preceded the highest holy day of Diwali, last week’s bombings exploded just one week before Holi, the Hindu rite of spring. Investigators noted the similarities between the composition and deployment of the explosives in both New Delhi and Varanasi. Additionally, “The type of explosives used, the way the blasts were timed together, the place of the blasts?these are all hallmarks of Lashkar,” said Yashpal Singh, a senior officer from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh investigating the Varanasi attacks.
Despite the similarities between the two attacks, the Varanasi bombings exploded in the midst of a highly charged political and religious environment that was significantly different in many ways from the October 2005 attack. First, it comes within weeks of the worldwide publication of a Danish Cartoon lampooning the sacrosanct founder of Islam, Mohammed, that has provoked violent reactions from Muslims around the globe (WAR Report and Intel Report). Second, the attacks were launched within days of the first visit of US President George Bush to India. It is possible that the attacks might be a protest against the US or even the announced nuclear agreement between the two; however, strikes against such a prominent religious target seem incongruous to a statement against the secular-minded US delegation. Third, the bombs exploded only hours before the arrival of Congress party leader Sonia Ghandi and Interior Minister Shivraj Patil who were en route to Varanasi that night; thus, assassination might be a motive. Nonetheless, it does seem more likely that the detonations were designed to polarize religious communities?regrettably, they had such an effect. Right-wing Hindu extremists immediately protested the bombings and called for a rally and a strike, shutting down services and businesses supporting the significant pilgrimage trade to the city. Officials hope to shed more light on the incidents as the investigation progresses.
Almost immediately, two promising leads appeared in the press. Salar (aka Salim), a known and wanted member of LeT was killed in a gunfight with authorities later that night just outside the Uttar Pradesh state capital Lucknow, some 190 miles from Varanasi. He was found carrying a pistol and 2.5 kilograms (5.5 pounds) of explosives. Authorities first hypothesized that he was involved in the Varanasi attack?perhaps as a planner?but never made conclusive statements. Subsequently, sketches of two suspects were circulated, and investigators arrested at least 10 people, but two resembling the sketches were released with strong alibis and lacking credible links to militant movements. The fate of the other eight remains unclear, but reports suggest they were linked to Salar and picked up not far from the shootout during a raid at a guesthouse in Hardoi, only 50 miles from Lucknow.
In sum, it is likely that both the October and March attacks are the work of LeT. Despite the group’s expanding interest, capacity, and global reach (suspected links to members in the Australia , the United Kingdom , and even the United States ), their recent activities in India have moved beyond Kashmir to civic and religious targets in the heart of India. Although the modus operandi of these two bombings is similar, they are not at the same level of audacity or sophistication as the LeT’s assault on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 . The recent operations are probably conceived and conducted by radicalized Muslims within India in contrast to the parliament assault team, which was likely trained and perhaps supported by elements in Pakistan. The death of Salar may be enough to disrupt local operations for a while, but too many militants continue to find resources and sanctuary in Pakistan for the LeT threat to be reduced significantly over the long-term.