Once considered the most lethal terrorist organization in the world, Sendero Luminoso , or Shining Path, has remained relatively obscure since the capture of Shining Path founder and political leader Abimael Guzman. Since Guzman’s 1992 arrest, the Shining Path has been struggling to find its way in a nation that has largely left the Maoist guerrilla group behind. Clinging to life, however, the remaining vanguard elements continue to perpetrate sporadic but deadly attacks against the Peruvian state. The most recent attack occurred in late 2005 when Shining Path guerrillas ambushed and killed eight Peruvian police officers near the town of Aucayacu . The attack reminded the Peruvian government and citizenry that active elements of the deadly Maoist group remain and are prepared to continue the long sought after struggle for a Maoist-inspired peasantry uprising. Acting mightily, President Alejandro Toledo declared a state of emergency in six jungle provinces, giving Peruvian security forces greater powers to pursue and eliminate guerrilla forces. The subsequent death of Shining Path guerrilla commander Hector Aponte, who is believed responsible for the ambush, could be a definitive blow to the group.
However, this belief may be a fallacy, considering the manner by which original Shining Path guerrillas engrained their belief systems into the youth of the Peruvian countryside. Initial Shining Path cadres, educated at the University of Huamanga, the center of the Maoist movement, often traveled home where they would instruct fellow youth in the movement and its principles. These new cadres would teach their children and friends and enmesh other peasant communities, ensuring the continuation of the struggle for several generations. It remains difficult to determine the effectiveness of these policies.
The relative tranquility experienced by the Peruvian state since the apprehension of Guzman should also not be taken as a sign that the movement is dead. The group historically has displayed remarkable patience. Originally formed in 1970, the insurgency did not perpetrate their first direct attack against the Peruvian state until 1977, using the large interval to establish and develop the movement’s support and ideological bases, respectively. Although no decisive proof exists to support this contention, the group continues to carry out well-planned and executed attacks. Insurgent movements need not execute daring and overwhelming attacks to ensure the continuation of their cause but must merely demonstrate to the Peruvian citizenry that they remain capable of attacking the Peruvian government at will. The general state of fear that these attacks cause can be a powerful tool and may continue to attract impoverished Peruvian peasantry to their cause.
The Peruvian government contends that the apprehension of Comrade Gonzalo, Guzman’s nom de guerre, broke the back of the insurgency due to the Shining Path’s leader-centric composition. Although Guzman’s detention has proven to be a severe setback to the movement, the organizational structure of the Shining Path did not eliminate the need for a well-developed secondary leadership, to include Hector Aponte and Comrade Artemio. Early research into the Shining Path by Gordon H. McCormick of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, suggested that Guzman was the force behind the inner workings of the Shining Path. However, a second-order leadership was well developed among the group. “Guzman’s leadership position and the centralized character of Sendero decision making have not eliminated the role of internal debate. Guzman himself has long advocated the value of dialectical debate.” However, these arguments remain speculative. The basic conditions that existed in the 1970s that helped to create the Shining Path are largely non-existent today. The Peruvian economy is strong, achieving a 6.7 percent growth in GDP in 2005 and a six percent-plus growth for the last five years. Massive infrastructure projects continue to be developed, greatly improving the general wellbeing of local citizenry. Toledo has far greater support than Alan Garcia possessed during his presidential tenure. The Peruvian military has revamped operations and has avoided heavy-handed responses to Shining Path attacks. The most basic elements necessary for an insurgency to prosper are no longer present, although it remains difficult to determine the successes Shining Path attacks and propaganda are having on the general mindset of the Peruvian peasantry.