Based on the UPI article, it would be difficult not to conclude that Thailand is the next vanguard of global jihadist extremism following down the increasingly well-trodden path blazed by al-Qaeda globally, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf regionally, and Abu Musa?ab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers in Iraq . The article interviews analysts in Asia, the UK , and the US who trace the increasing sophistication and lethality of Thai insurgent attacks over the 25-month uprising, which has killed over 1,100 people, according to official Thai government reports. That significant number is evidence that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra faces a major challenge?not a mere spate of gang activity or organized crime (WAR Report and WAR Report). However, despite claims that militants have trained variously in Malaysia , Afghanistan , Pakistan , Indonesia , Philippines , and even Libya , little hard evidence has surfaced that this movement is linked internationally. It is, therefore, instructive to reexamine the events to determine what it is not.
The Muslim insurgency in Thailand differs from al-Qaeda in many ways. First, it is not global in its reach or its interest. Attacks remain focused primarily on military and government buildings, institutions, and employees, and on symbols of the Buddhist majority (ie. priests and temples). Only one strike seemed to target foreigners when, on April 2, 2005, coordinated attacks struck a regional airport and city hotel . Targeting Westerners is a common tactic of al-Qaeda, JI, and Abu Sayyaf. Al-Qaeda and JI also are led by charismatic leaders who are vocal in their belief in a radical fundamentalist ideology and keen to unite dispersed supporters across geographic boundaries. The Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand is strategically leaderless, although the increasing sophistication in local operations suggests a cadre of tactical leaders has emerged. Yet, no clear ideological or even political message is enunciated nor has an appeal to ethno-linguistic co-religionists across the border in Malaysia been made. If terrorism is a form of political communication, the Thai insurgency is speaking volumes: they demand autonomy from Thai authority, if not
independence. Such calls echoed for over a century when Siam annexed the Malay-speaking Muslim provinces into the Buddhist majority kingdom.
That is what the insurgency is, but what concerns authorities, policy makers, and analysts alike worldwide is what will the insurgency become? The age of globalization of travel and communication is here, and it is likely at least a handful of the most militant-minded southern Thailand Muslims traveled for training?probably in Malaysia or Indonesia, but possibly the Philippines or even Afghanistan (reports of cadres trained in Libya notwithstanding). Invariably some also have utilized data and resources available over the Internet. Nonetheless, the movement remains strangely, if not steadfastly, isolated from international logistical or even rhetorical support. As such, the mainstream movement will continue targeting local government and Buddhist targets for the foreseeable future: at least until the Prime Minister drastically alters his posture and significantly engages local leaders (not the exiled Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) leadership currently residing in Sweden ). The lingering fear is that even a small faction will break off and follow the path of Jemaah Islamiya’s Bali bomber plotter (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident), Noordin Mohammad Top who recently declared himself leader of the newly created Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad , covering Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei , and the Philippines and target civilians in mass casualty attacks.
Australian officials believe something similar may already be underway. In January 2006, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade issued travel warnings for Thailand, advising travelers to “exercise a high degree of caution…because of the high threat of terrorist attack. We continue to receive reports that terrorists are planning attacks against a range of targets, including places frequented by foreigners.” Since Australian government sources suggest that the areas of Phuket, Pattong, Pattaya, Bangkok and the island of Samui could be targeted, a split from the main insurgency may already have occurred. If so, the question will not be if Bangkok is bombed, but rather, when.