In space, no one can hear your pleading about the value of soft power. Just ask Colombia. In 1976, the South American country hosted a meeting attended by Brazil, Ecuador, Uganda, Kenya, Indonesia and both Congos. The gathered nations declared that the stretch of geostationary orbit above them was not part of outer space, but belonged exclusively to their respective countries. The Bogotá Declaration was a total failure. Although Colombia’s territorial claim remains written into its constitution, the declaration never gained wider purchase, and the exploitation of ‘their’ real estate has continued. The group of countries had a common diagnosis: that the laws governing space were drawn up to benefit the world’s great powers, rather than all nations. And they were right, though that will be little comfort to them. Since the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states that any space exploration shall be carried out “in the interests of all countries”, was first signed by the US, the Soviet Union and the UK, a country’s ability to assert itself in space has always been inextricably bound up in its ability to exercise hard power on Earth. One good demonstration of that is the US unilaterally setting laws on matters where the 1967 treaty is silent or ambiguous, such as commercial activities like lunar and asteroid mining. Last month’s Chandrayaan-3 landing on the Moon was a significant moment because it provided a romantic illustration of something we already know: India is an ascendant power in the 21st century. But the moment was also significant for another reason: the country managed to reach the unexplored South Pole for reportedly as little as $74mn: a little more than Arsenal Football Club paid to secure the services of German footballer Kai Havertz. The low cost of this lunar mission is, in some ways, non-replicable for many other countries, and driven to some extent by knowhow acquired during India’s 54-year-old space programme.
Full opinion : The new scramble for space requires a fresh set of rules.
