The government appointed Winograd Commission released a report highly critical of the Israeli Cabinet and top military leadership’s conduct during the first six days of Israel’s 2006 summer war with Hezbollah. Ultimately, the Commission findings will lead to a government shake-up in Israel, and a period of introspection and reform that could significantly alter the strategic approach of the country’s political and security sectors.
Despite the report’s damning characterization and the subsequent calls for his resignation, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will likely remain in power until the end of the summer when the Commission releases its permanent findings and recommendations. Furthermore, the lame duck status of Olmert and his Kadima party’s ruling coalition constrains, if not dooms, any near term progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Olmert Survives Temporarily
The report describes Prime Minister Olmert, a national security neophyte, as hastily stumbling into a war prosecuted without a detailed military plan and seeking, “over-ambitious and not feasible” goals (source). Moreover, Olmert’s decision-making was, “a severe failure in exercising judgment, responsibility, and prudence,” (source) that narrowly relied on the Army’s ill-conceived recommendations.
Though Olmert’s popularity now polls in the single digits among the Israeli populace, fear of a right wing take-over of the Israeli government will prevent Olmert from being immediately replaced as Prime Minister. A call for new elections only benefits the conservative Likud party and its controversial leader – former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – at the expense of the governing coalition’s largest parties, Kadima and Labor. Thus, the Kadima party is currently standing behind Olmert with some notable exceptions, including Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. Labor is also unlikely to leave the coalition in the coming weeks, and will make a future determination after their internal elections are decided in early June 2007.
Olmert will likely have three to four months to fulfill his promise of implementing the Winograd Commission initial recommendations. The final report analyzing the government’s conduct over the entire 34-day duration of the war is scheduled for release at the end of summer 2007. It will likely be as critical as its predecessor, may personally recommend Olmert’s resignation, and will present an ideal political opportunity for the Kadima Party and Israeli government to move forward with new leadership.
Moribund Peace Process
The government of Prime Minister Olmert now joins the club of ‘non-viable peace partners’; a charge often levied by Israeli officials at Palestinian President Abbas for his inability to enforce or carryout agreed to positions. Humiliated by the Winograd Report, dogged by several unresolved financial probes, and lacking popular support, Prime Minister Olmert cannot effectively lead the Israeli public into making the difficult concessions necessary in an eventual peace settlement.
US officials, who only weeks ago held out hope for a top level summit between Israel and sponsors of the Arab League Peace Initiative (Previous Report), have lowered expectations and will work to improve communication and the day to day living situation of either side: limiting rocket attacks into southern Israel; improving the movement and economy of Palestinians living in Gaza. Even in its devolved form, US policymakers will remain committed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as much to sustain conditional Arab state support of its Iraq policy, as in the hope of reaching any significant breakthrough.
The Winograd Report also ascribes the decision-making debacle to the government’s failure to update the national security doctrine, both during and prior to Olmert’s tenure. In the span of three years, the country has gone from an embrace of unilateral withdrawals to a two-front military engagement (Previous Report) from the withdrawn territory (Lebanon and Gaza) to the current tense uncertainty surrounding future policy. The process of challenging old assumptions – namely primary reliance on a military deterrent – could produce an Israeli strategic approach with a stronger diplomatic emphasis regarding state neighbors and the Palestinians.
